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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 35/ T H'xrcan 
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Robert: Berrett, Gerald 
Argyle, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellantsf 
v. 
Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company., 
Inc. , 
Defendant and Appellee. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 910215-CA 
F I L E D 
( A p r i l 3 , 1 9 9 2 ) 
Fourth District, Utah County 
The Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen 
Attorneys: Allen K. Young and Randy S. Kester, Springville, for 
Appellant 
Michael F. Richman and Eric C. Olson, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Jackson. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Plaintiffs brought suit against defendant for damages 
suffered as a result of a landslide in Utah County. Defendant 
prevailed at trial. Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's decision 
to preclude one of their expert witnesses from testifying. We 
reverse and remand for a new trial. 
BACKGROUND 
On April 13, 1983, a massive landslide began to move down 
the hillside in Spanish Fork Canyon, just downriver of the small 
town of Thistle. The slide progressed into the canyon and 
blocked the Spanish Fork River. A small lake formed that 
inundated and destroyed Thistle. The lake was approximately one 
hundred feet deep and remained for approximately six months until 
the slide was breached and the water receded. The town was 
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thereafter designated a flood plain, and no one has been allowed 
to rebuild- Plaintiffs are the former inhabitants of Thistle. 
Plaintiffs claim that the landslide was caused by 
defendant's construction activities at the toe of the slide. In 
tne late 13 00s, a predecessor railroad made a cut near the toe of 
tne slide in order to run its tracks up the canyon. Defendant 
subsequently made a second cut in the early 1900s and a final cut 
in 1951. Plaintiffs estimate that the total soil removed by 
these cuts amounted to between 10,000 and 15,000 cubic yards. In 
essence, plaintiffs claim that but for the cuts made at the toe 
of the slide, the slide would not have occurred, or at least it 
would not have been as massive, and their homes would not have 
been destroyed. 
Defendant, on the other hand, asserts that inasmuch as the 
slide began at the top and moved downward, the landslide would 
have occurred even if the soil had not been removed from the toe. 
Defendant therefore claims that its actions were not the cause of 
the slide. 
Plaintiffs commenced this action against defendant in March 
of 1986. Trial was initially set for August 10, 1987, but was 
continued and set for February 21, 1989. Another continuance set 
trial for August 14, 1989. On June 27, 1989, the trial court 
conducted a pre-trial hearing. Defendant complained that 
plaintiffs had not provided defendant with their final witness 
list in response to its interrogatory.1 The trial court warned 
plaintiffs about their failure to disclose their witnesses, but 
did not set a deadline for the final disclosure of witnesses. At 
the suggestion of defense counsel, the trial court instructed the 
parties to submit a scheduling order and a pre-trial order within 
ten days. No scheduling order was submitted, nor do we have any 
record that one was ever discussed by the parties. No pre-trial 
order was ever submitted because the parties could not agree on 
its content. 
1. The record is replete with accusations from both parties of 
dilatory action by the other side. Suffice it to say that this 
has been a strongly contested lawsuit and this court need not 
assess blame for the delays. We do note, however, that part of 
the delay, as indicated by the trial court, was due to 
defendant's failure to respond fully to plaintiffs' 
interrogatories regarding any other slide-related lawsuits 
against defendant. At the June 27th hearing, plaintiffs were 
still seeking copies of depositions from defendant regarding a 
separate slide-related lawsuit. 
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Defendant:'3 counsel indicated to plaintiffs' counsel in a 
_etter aated July 12, 1989, that defendant expected plaintiffs' 
final witness list no later than Augusr 1st. Counsel for 
defendant also sent a proposed pre-trial order to plaintiffs7 
:ounsei. The proposed oraer indicated "at the names of all 
vitnesses to ce called at trial, not already listed in the 
proposed pre-trial order, oe delivered to opposing counsel and 
filed with the trial court at least ten days prior to trial. 
On July 18th and 19th, following the June 27th hearing, 
plaintiffs' counsel met with one of their expert witnesses, Dr. 
Olson, and reviewed reports written about the Thistle slide area. 
Plaintiffs' counsel agreed with Dr. Olson at that time to attempt 
to locate one of the authors, Dr. John F. Shroder, a 
geomorphologist and a recognized expert on the Thistle slide 
area.2 Plaintiffs' counsel contacted Dr. Shroder by telephone 
and concluded that his testimony would be beneficial to 
plaintiffs' case. 
On August 1, 1989, plaintiffs provided defendant with their 
final witness list. Dr. Shroder was included on the list along 
with six other possible witnesses named for the first time. On 
August 3, 1989, defendant moved to exclude the new witnesses, 
including Dr. Shroder. The trial court ordered the exclusion of 
the testimony of Dr. Shroder and any other witnesses not 
disclosed on or before July 11, 1989. 
The plaintiffs' claim was tried to a jury from August 14th 
through August 29th of 1989. At the conclusion of trial, the 
jury rendered a special verdict in favor of defendant. The trial 
court entered judgment in favor of defendant, dismissing all 
claims with prejudice. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully moved for a new 
trial. They now raise several issues on appeal, including 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in texcluding the 
testimony of expert witness Dr. Shroder. Inasmuch as our 
resolution of this issue demands a new trial, we do not reach the 
remaining allegations of error at trial. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Trial courts have broad discretion in managing the cases 
assigned to their courts. See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 16. We 
will not interfere with a trial court's case management unless 
its actions amount to an abuse of discretion. See Dugan v. 
Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1244 (Utah 1980). Excluding a witness from 
2. Dr. Shroder prepared his doctoral thesis on the Thistle slide 
area and published an article discussing the area in 1967. 
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testifying is, however, "extreme in nature and . . . should be 
employed only with caution and restraint." Plonkev v. Superior, 
106 Ariz. 310, 475 P.2d 492, 494 (1970), See also Nickev v. 
Brown, 7 Ohio App. 3d 32, 454 N.E.2d 177 (1982) (exclusion is 
severe sanction which should be invoked only to enforce willful 
noncompliance). 
If a trial court erroneously excludes a witness, we will 
reverse if the error was prejudicial to the substantial rights of 
a party. See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 61. 
It is not always easy to tell when an 
error should be regarded as prejudicial 
. . . . [If] the error appears to be of 
such a nature that it can be said with 
assurance that it was of no material 
consequence in its effect upon the trial 
because reasonable minds would have 
arrived at the same result, regardless of 
such error, it would be harmless and the 
granting of a new trial would not be 
warranted. On the other hand, if it 
appears to be of sufficient moment that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that in 
the absence of such error a different 
result would have eventuated, the error 
should be regarded as prejudicial and 
relief should be granted. Measured by 
such considerations we assay the possible 
effect of the error complained of, 
realizing of course that it is now quite 
impossible to tell definitely whether the 
verdict would have been different. 
[If] we cannot, with any degree of 
assurance, affirm that the use of such 
evidence would not have been helpful to 
the plaintiff, the doubt should be 
resolved in favor of allowing him to have 
a full and fair presentation of his cause 
to the jury. 
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Joseon --. :;.H. I-roves Latter-day Saints HCSP., 7 Utah 2d 39, 44, 
313 P.Za 330, 233 (1957).3 See also Morten Int'l. Inc. y. State 
Tax Ccr.r.'n. 314 ?.2d 581r 534 (Utah 1991) "an error will be 
harmless if it is 'sufficiently inconsequential that there is no 
reasonacie likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings'" (quoting State v. Verde, 77C P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 
1989)) empnasis added)). 
ANALYSIS 
Timeliness of Disclosure 
Plaintiffs contend that inasmuch as there was no court order 
mandating disclosure by a certain date, they acted reasonably in 
relying on representations from defendant that August 1, 1989, 
was an acceptable date for submitting the final witness list. In 
3. Contrary to the implication of the dissent in footnote two, 
the supreme court did not alter this standard when the same case 
was appealed a second time in Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-day 
Saints Hosp., 10 Utah 2d 94, 100, 348 P.2d 935, 938 (1960). The 
case was initially remanded for a new trial with instructions to 
allow the excluded evidence. The jury again found in favor of 
the defendants. A totally new issue was then raised in the 
second appeal, i.e., whether the trial court erred in not giving 
a jury an instruction on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. The 
supreme court concluded that the requested instruction was 
properly denied and that no error was made. Prejudice, 
therefore, was not even at issue in the second opinion. The 
supreme court nevertheless stated the following dicta which 
immediately precedes the dicta quoted by the dissent. 
What the parties are entitled to . . . is 
an opportunity for one claiming a 
grievance . . . to present it to a court 
or jury and to have a fair trial. When 
this is done, and the verdict and 
judgment are entered, all presumptions 
are in favor of validity. 
Id. 
In the first Joseph appeal, the suprer.e court held that the 
plaintiff did not have a fair opportunity to present his case 
because of the improper exclusion of the evidence. There was 
not, therefore, any presumption of validity and any doubt was to 
be resolved in favor of the appellant. In the second case, the 
evidence was admitted, thereby creating the presumption of 
validity. The language quoted in the text, despite its age, 
remains good law as to when we will presume the validity of the 
judgment so as tc apply the standard relied upon by the dissent. 
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particular, plaintiffs rely upon the July 12th letter referring 
to August 1st as the dare defendant expected plaintiffs' final 
witness list. Plaintiffs also assert that their disclosure was 
reasonable inasmuch as it would have been timely under the 
proposed pre-trial order prepared by defendant's counsel 
indicating that new witnesses should be disclosed no later than 
ten days before trial. 
Defendant, on the other hand, contends that despite any 
representations it may have made, plaintiffs were bound by a 
deadline set by the trial court, Cf. Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 
P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah 1988) (trial court had discretion to deny 
motion to continue trial despite parties' separate agreement to 
continue). According to defendant, the trial court set a 
deadline for the disclosure of witnesses when it indicated at the 
June 27th hearing that a pre-trial order was to be prepared 
within ten days. The trial court itself indicated at the August 
3rd hearing on defendant's motion to exclude Dr. Shroder's 
testimony that it "expected" the witnesses to be listed in the 
pre-trial order. 
A trial court's power to sanction a party for failure to 
cooperate in discovery comes from rule 37(b)(2) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which provides that if a party fails to obey 
an order entered under rule 26(f), the court may prohibit the 
offending party from introducing designated matters into 
evidence. Rule 26(f) addresses discovery conferences and directs 
that following a discovery conference the trial court shall enter 
an order "establishing a plan and schedule for discovery." As 
has been recognized by other states,4 the necessary prerequisite 
to the imposition of a sanction is an order that "brings the 
offender squarely within possible contempt of court." Sexton v. 
4. See Clarke v. Sanders, 363 So.2d 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1978) (there was no pretrial order requiring the parties to list 
witnesses on a pretrial statement); Henderson v. Illinois Cent. 
Gulf R.R. Co.. 114 111. App. 3d 754, 449 N.E.2d 942 (1983) (a 
violation is a condition precedent to the imposition of a 
sanction); Lindlev v. St. Mary's Hosp., 85 111. App. 3d 559, 406 
N.E.2d 952 (1980) (no order of court or rule of discovery was 
contravened); Fruehauf Trailer Div. v. Thornton, 174 Ind. App. 1, 
366 N.E.2d 21 (1977) (no entry of the pre-trial order was made in 
the record before the issue of the disputed expert arose); 
McHenrv v. Hanover Ins. Co., 246 So.2d 374, 377 (La. Ct. App. 
1970) (no formal pre-trial order was entered); Inner City 
Wrecking Co. v. Bilsky, 51 Ohio App. 2d 220, 367 N.E.2d 1214 
(1977) (before a party may be sanctioned, party must be in 
default of an order rendered by the trial court which was 
properly announced and formally entered). 
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Sugar Creek Packing Co., :S Ohio App. 2d 32, 311 N.E.2d 535, 538 
197 3 (absent an oraer, a parry may believe that the courr has 
no ocrection to the information as supplied)• See also Whitehead 
-. Arerican Motors Sales Corp., 301 P.2d 920, 925-26 (Utan 1990) 
improper to sanction defendant for not producing test films 
.;hicn did not fall witmn express terms of order) . Cf. 3 Charles 
A. Wngnt and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, 
Chap. 6 Sanctions § 2239 (Supp. 1991) (federal rule 37(b)(2) 
applies "only if there has already been an order"). 
Contrary to defendant's assertion and the trial court's 
belief, a review of the record reveals that the trial court did 
not set a deadline for witness disclosure at the June 27th 
hearing. While the disclosure of witnesses was discussed at the 
hearing, no motion was before the trial court and no order was 
made establishing a deadline. The trial court itself indicated: 
[T]here's nothing before the court except 
some generalities that you talked about. 
. . . I don't know what else to do with 
you, counsel, except to direct you to the 
Rules of Civil Procedure and have you 
follow it in writing, and that's about 
all I can do. Simply make your motions, 
I'll rule on them as they are presented. 
I have nothing before me today to 
consider. 
Given the trial court's express declaration that it was not 
acting upon any motion at the hearing, the fact that the court 
may have had an unexpressed expectation that the pre-trial order 
would contain the final witness list simply did not impose a 
clear and affirmative deadline on plaintiffs' counsel. 
Defendant's counsel even conceded at the hearing that it had 
not sought the hearing "to get the court to render any orders." 
He simply was seeking to "make this a kind of status conference 
so the court knows where things are going." The trial court then 
admonished the parties to attempt to work things out: 
And if you can't, all I can suggest to 
you, you've got the rules of civil 
procedure, and we'll have to play by the 
book and let the chips fall where they 
may. I hate to see that. Lots of times 
we can accomplish a great deal more by 
cooperation than otherwise. But when 
that fails then we have a rule to fall 
back on . . . . 
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So I'm going to direct that whatever 
motions you are going to file that, 
either to compel or any purpose, that we 
ought to have rhose filed no later than 
ten days from today. 
The parties failed to present either a scheduling order or a 
pre-trial order at the end of the ten-day period. Defendant 
neither filed a motion to compel plaintiffs to disclose their 
final witness list, nor did the trial court enter any order 
establishing any deadlines for the final disclosure of witnesses 
pursuant to the discretion granted to it under rule 26(f). 
The actions of defendant's own counsel belie a claim that a 
deadline was set at the June 27th hearing. Defendant's counsel 
sent a letter on July 12th indicating an August 1st deadline for 
the final disclosure of witnesses. The proposed pre-trial order 
prepared by defendant's counsel, while never agreed to by the 
parties, also provides insight into counsel's understanding of 
the trial court's instructions at the hearing. The proposed 
order indicated that if plaintiffs desired to add new witnesses 
not already listed in the proposed order, then those witnesses 
could be disclosed up until ten days prior to the trial. 
Defendant's counsel now seeks to repudiate these representations 
by simply saying that he did not mean them. Such a repudiation, 
however, is patently unfair to plaintiffs who relied upon those 
representations and would be prejudiced by their withdrawal. 
Defendant, therefore, may not now claim that it had not agreed to 
an August 1st deadline, nor may it assert that it was prejudiced 
or surprised by the timely disclosure on August 1st. See Jansen 
v. Lichwa, 13 Ariz. App. 168, 474 P.2d 1020 (1970) (sanction was 
improper when complaining party consented to continuing discovery 
until trial); cf. Whitehead. 801 P.2d at 925-26 (it was improper 
to exclude test of Jeep CJ-5 for defendant's purported failure to 
comply with discovery order when discovery order only required 
disclosure of tests of Jeep Commandos); Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa. 
Super. 92, 444 A.2d 674 (1982) (defendant could not complain of 
prejudice when it requested an expert witness list only 23 days 
before trial). 
Defendant also claims that plaintiffs may not challenge the 
trial court's preclusion of Dr. Shroder's testimony because they 
never adequately proffered Dr. Shroder's testimony under rule 
103(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The preclusion of Dr. 
Shroder's testimony, however, was not an evidentiary ruling to 
which rule 103 would apply; it was a case management decision 
under the rules of civil procedure. It is clear from the record 
that the substance of the testimony had no bearing upon the trial 
court's decision. Therefore, any proffer of the substance of Dr. 
Shroder's testimony would have neither benefitted the trial court 
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-.or :aused it to "correct11 its decision which is the purpose of 
evidentiary rule 103(1) (2).' The failure to proffer therefore 
ices nor preclude an appeal of a case management decision.^ 
We hold that absent an order creating a judicially imposed 
deadline, a trial court may not sanction a party by excluding 
its witnesses under rule 37(b)(2). See Inner City WrecKina Co. 
v. Bilskv. 51 Ohio App. 2d 220, 367 N.E.2d 1214, 1218 (1983) 
(without an order compelling compliance with court rules, the 
sanction imposed by trial court was beyond its authority). The 
5. The dissent asserts that no new trial should be ordered 
because plaintiffs did not object to the exclusion of Dr. Shroder 
until after the trial. The record, however, clearly indicates 
that the plaintiffs objected at the August 3rd hearing. The 
dissent also implies, without any supporting authority, that 
before trial plaintiffs should have sought a writ of mandamus 
ordering the trial court to permit Dr. Shroder to testify. Sound 
judicial policy dictates that we not increase the burden on our 
already over-burdened system by requiring collateral attacks 
during a pending case in order to preserve issues for appeal. 
6. The dissent asserts that plaintiffs could have, and should 
have, used Dr. Shroder as a rebuttal witness. The trial court 
ruled: "I'm not going to permit you to offer the testimony or 
bring out any witnesses that were not designated or known by the 
[sic] July the 11th, 1989." (Emphasis added.) Counsel for 
plaintiffs claims that he understood this to be an absolute bar 
to using Dr. Shroder, either in the case in chief or in rebuttal. 
Given the absolute language used, this was a reasonable 
interpretation. Contrary to the dissent's representation, the 
trial court never indicated otherwise. The language relied upon 
by the dissent in footnote three, which it argues left open the 
possibility of "the testimony" being used in rebuttal, was 
actually spoken in reference to 73 depositions plaintiffs had 
requested permission to use. The trial court told plaintiffs 
they could only use specific passages of the 73 depositions, but 
that any portion of the depositions could be used in rebuttal if 
needed to challenge the veracity of any witness. Given the 
absolute language used by the trial court, we do not fault the 
plaintiffs for not attempting to use Dr. Shroder in rebuttal. 
7. The Utah Supreme Court has previously acknowledged that a 
written order is not statutorily required. Duqan v. Jones, 615 
P.2d 1239, 1244 (Utah 1980). In this case, however, we do not 
even have an oral order from the bench. We add our voice to that 
of the supreme court in encouraging the entry of written orders 
so as to reduce the type of confusion that has arisen in this 
case. Id. 
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dissenr faults us for only considering the trial court's ruling 
under rule 37(b)(2). It asserts rhat the trial court may have 
excluded Dr. Shroder because plaintiffs proceeded in bad faith. 
Not only does such a speculative conclusion ignore the fact that 
there vas no evidence that the plaintiffs acted in bad faith,8 it 
misses rhe thrust of this opinion which is that absent an express 
order of the trial court setting a specific deadline for the 
disclosure of the final witness list, plaintiffs did not act in 
bad faith. 
No order was entered at the June 27th hearing, nor do we 
have any indication that any such order was ever entered relating 
to the August 14th trial date.9 Defendant even conceded that 
there was no scheduling order in place when it moved to exclude 
Dr. Shroder's testimony. By exceeding its procedural authority 
granted by the rules, the trial court abused its discretion. 
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah App. 
1991) (stepping outside the arena of discretion is an abuse of 
discretion). 
Prejudice 
As to whether the erroneous exclusion of Dr. Shroder's 
testimony was harmless, we follow the reasoning of the supreme 
8. Plaintiffs' counsel told the trial court that he made the 
decision to call Dr. Shroder in mid-July. The trial court 
clearly believed plaintiffs' counsel should have made the 
decision earlier, but there is no indication that the trial court 
believed the plaintiffs acted in bad faith. In fact, the example 
relied upon by the dissent as an indication of the plaintiffs7 
bad faith, i.e., the late request to use 73 depositions from 
another case, was caused by the defendant. The trial court 
itself expressly blamed defendant, not plaintiffs, for that 
delay. 
9. There was a scheduling order entered prior to the February 
10. 198 9, trial date indicating that witness lists were to be 
exchanged on November 15, 1988. That date, however, was 
effectively rendered moot by the continuance of the February 
trial date to August 1989. The trial court indicated at the June 
27th hearing that it had merely anticipated that the earlier 
schedule regarding the February trial date would be 
proportionately applied to the August trial date. Such an 
unexpressed assumption is simply insufficient to create a new and 
binding schedule. See Inner City Wrecking Co., 367 N.E.2d at 
1218 (order must be properly announced and entered before 
sanctions may be imposed). 
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court in Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-day Saints Hospital. 313 
?. 2d at ::4. 
Some indication of the importance of the 
error with ..nich we are nere concerned is 
to be founa in the fact that counsel 
thought the matter of sufficient 
consequence that he objected to [the 
admission of the evidence]. It strikes 
the writer as being somewhat inconsistent 
that counsel now urges that depriving 
plaintiff of the use of such evidence was 
merely harmless error. If it is so plain 
that it would not have helped plaintiff's 
case, one is led to wonder why counsel 
made the objection and insisted that it 
not be used. The obvious answer seems to 
be that defendant's counsel was actually 
apprehensive that it may have a 
substantial effect against his client. 
Of course, he could not be sure, nor can 
we. 
In view of the fact that there is such 
substantial doubt that we cannot, with 
any degree of assurance, affirm that the 
use of such evidence would not have been 
helpful to the plaintiff, the doubt 
should be resolved in favor of allowing 
him to have a full and fair presentation 
of his cause to the jury. 
At the August 3rd pre-trial hearing, defendant strongly 
objected to allowing Dr. Shroder to testify at trial. At that 
time, defendant was aware of Dr. Shroder's article and his 
geomorphological credentials. Defendant also knew that Dr. 
Sxhroder was being offered as a witness to support plaintiffs' 
contentions that the defendant's actions at the toe of the slide 
contributed to the slide. At trial, defendant argued that its 
geomorphology experts were more credible than plaintiffs' 
geotechnical engineering experts. Dr. Shroder's testimony as a 
geomorphologist, which would have indicated that the slide was 
caused by defendant's cuts at the toe of the slide, would have 
directly contradicted defendant's geomorphologists' conclusion 
that the slide started at the top. 
Given defendant's own emphasis on the type of experts 
presented, we cannot say that the geomorphological credentials 
and testimony of Dr. Shroder would not have been helpful to the 
plaintiffs' case in this battle of expert witnesses. In 
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accordance with tne supreme court's direction in Joseph, v:e 
resolve the doubt in favcr of the plaintiffs having an 
opportunity to fully and fairly present their case and find that 
the exclusion of 2r. Shrcder's geomorphological testimony was 
prejudicial.l0 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant agreed that plaintiffs could disclose their final 
witness list on August 1st and therefore may not claim prejudice 
when plaintiffs disclosed Dr. Shroder on August 1st. Inasmuch as 
the plaintiffs did not violate any court order compelling 
discovery of their expert witnesses, the trial court abused its 
discretion by excluding the testimony of Dr. Shroder. We cannot 
with any degree of assurance conclude that the improper exclusion 
of Dr. Shroder's testimony did not affect the outcome of the 
case. 
The judgment of the trial court is therefore reversed and 
led-ior a new trial. 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
RegfTal fr. Garf f, Judge / \ 
/ / 
10. We note in response to the dissent that the difference in 
our views as to whether there is prejudice in this case appears 
to arise from the fact that the dissent relies upon cases where 
the disputed evidence was erroneously admitted, rather than 
excluded. When evidence is erroneously admitted, it is possible 
for a reviewing court to excise the offending evidence and 
evaluate the remaining uncontested evidence so as to determine 
whether the properly admitted evidence is such that the 
prevailing party would have prevailed anyway. Where evidence is 
excluded, however, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
conclude on review that the missing evidence would not have made 
a difference to the jury. The jury has never had the opportunity 
to hear the excluded evidence and weigh it against that which is 
admitted. The presumption of validity relied upon by the dissent 
is therefore absent when evidence is erroneously excluded. 
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JACKSCN, Judge, dissenting: 
Because I do not think the plaintiffs nave net their rurden 
or esiaolisning substantial prejudice, I respectfully dissent 
from tne majority's decision to reverse and remand. 
Even if I were persuaded that the trial court's action in 
excluaing Dr. Shrcaer from testifying was an abuse of 
discretion,1 the plaintiffs still must establish that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the result at trial would have been 
different without his testimony. Batt v. State, 28 Utah 2d 417, 
503 P.2d 855, 859 (Utah 1972); Bowden v. Denver & Rio Grande 
Western R.R.. 3 Utah 2d 444, 286 P.2d 240, 244 (Utah 1955). "No 
error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence . . . 
is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a 
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to 
the court inconsistent with substantial justice." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 61. Absent any showing by plaintiffs that the outcome would 
have differed, every reasonable presumption as to the validity of 
the verdict below must be taken as true upon appeal. Leigh 
Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982). 
The majority opinion ignores the language of Rule 61 and the 
cases which have interpreted that rule as placing the burden on 
the complaining party to establish substantial prejudice, and 
instead relies upon a 1957 case for the proposition that if we 
1. However, the majority's reliance upon Rule 37(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure in reaching this conclusion is 
misplaced. I agree with the majority that the trial court had 
not entered an order regarding discovery, and that therefore, no 
discovery order was violated. See Henderson v. Illinois Cent. 
Gulf R.R., 449 N.E.2d 942, 944 (111. 1983) (no order for 
discovery so court could not sanction for discovery violation). 
But the trial court did not cite Rule 37(b) as justification for 
excluding the Shroder testimony. The trial court stated that 
because plaintiffs admitted having known about the witnesses "a 
long time ago" and had failed to designate who they were, those 
witnesses would be excluded from testifying. 
It is just as conceivable that the trial court decided to 
exclude the testimony because it felt plaintiffs had consistently 
proceeded in bad faith in preparing for trial. On August 1, 
fourteen days before the twelve-day trial was to commence, 
plaintiffs disclosed they intended to call an additional seventy-
eight witnesses (through live testimony or deposition). The 
trial court excluded the testimony of only three of these 
witnesses. The trial court then ordered plaintiffs to designate 
what portions of the 75 depositions they intended to read, but 
did not exclude this testimony. 
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cannot decide that there was prejudice, we must reverse the 
decision of the trial court and order a new trial.2 
Cn appeal, plaintiffs argue the ;ury was deprived of hearing 
relevant information because the trial court excluded Shroder's 
testirony. Plaintiffs rurther allege that Shroder should have, 
at a nmimur., been allowed to testify as a rebuttal witness." 
Plaintiffs' only mention of the prejudice suffered by them is m e 
rere assertion that Shroder's testimony was "crucial to 
plaintiffs' case." Plaintiffs did not petition for an 
extraordinary writ and chose instead to take their chances and 
proceed to trial. They made no attempt to offer the Shroder 
testimony cn rebuttal.4 It was only after they lost at trial, 
2. Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-day Saints Hosp., 7 Utah 2d 39, 
318 P.2d 330, 333 (1957), upon which the majority opinion relies, 
held that because the trial court allowed certain notes to be 
admitted into evidence, it should also have allowed counsel to 
nelabor[ate] for the benefit of those uninitiated in the 
mysteries cf medical terminology." Instead, the trial court had 
sustained defendant's objection to allowing plaintiff to read and 
use the notes in his argument. The case was remanded for a new 
trial, and the jury again returned a verdict of no cause of 
action. Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-day Saints Hosp., 10 Utah 
2d 94, 348 ?.2d 935, 936 (1960). When the case was appealed for 
a second time, the supreme court stated firmly that "[t]he burden 
is upon the appellant not only to show that there was error, but 
that it was prejudicial to the extent that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that in its absence there would have been a different 
result." Jd. at 938. This is the same burden which I recognize 
as being on plaintiffs in the instant case. 
3. Plaintiffs offered no rebuttal witnesses at trial and the 
record does not support plaintiffs' contention that they were 
precluded from introducing Shroder as a rebuttal witness. The 
trial court in fact, at the August 3rd hearing, told counsel for 
plaintiffs that while the excluded evidence could not be used as 
part of the case-in-chief, the court was not foreclosing the 
possibility of using the testimony "to impeach or for some other 
purpose, if there is a dispute in testimony." 
4. Plonkev, the Arizona case cited by the majority opinion 
involved facts much different than those before us. There, the 
plaintiff, whose witness had been excluded by the trial court for 
similar reasons, did petition for review of that decision before 
the trial commenced, utilizing a writ of mandamus. We do not 
suggest that had the plaintiffs petitioned the trial court for a 
similar writ, a new trial would then be appropriate. We simply 
point out that plaintiffs did not exhaust all remedies available 
(continued.. .) 
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that plaintiff objected to the exclusion of the Shroder 
testimony. 
Plaintiffs in this case have failed to provide this court 
with any basis for declaring rhat the trial court's exclusion of 
Shroder's testimony was prejudicial to the extent that: without 
the exclusion, there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome 
of the trial would have been different.5 Because plainriffs fail 
to meet this burden, their contention is without merit. See 
Ashton, 733 P.2d at 154. I would affirm the trial court, and 
thus dissent from the majority's decision to reverse the trial 
court and remand for a new trial. 
4. (...continued) 
to them, nor did they attempt to introduce Shroder's testimony on 
rebuttal. 
Further, the trial court's ruling in this case could not 
have been as unexpected as plaintiffs would have us believe. At 
a hearing on June 27, the trial court warned the parties that if 
they did not disclose their witnesses, it would make an order 
that they could not testify. 
5. See Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Utah 1988) 
(Zimmermann, J. concurring) (any error by trial court in 
excluding evidence was not shown to have "sufficiently undermined 
the outcome"); Redevelopment Agency v. Jones. 743 P.2d 1233, 1235 
(Utah 1987) (even if it is determined on appeal that a trial 
court erred, "we must also consider whether or not the error was 
prejudicial"); Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987) 
(appellant must establish "not only that an error occurred, but 
that it was substantial and prejudicial in that appellant was 
deprived in some manner of a full and fair consideration of the 
disputed issues by the jury"); Onveabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 
P.2d 525, 529 (Utah App. 1990) ("Even if we assume that the 
admission of [the expert's] testimony constituted error, 
plaintiff fails to demonstrate how he was prejudiced. Any error 
in the admission of evidence must be disregarded unless it 
substantially affects the substantial rights of the parties."); 
cf. Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp.. 801 P.2d 920, 928 
(Utah 1990) (cumulative effect of trial court's errors in 
excluding evidence substantially prejudiced defendants' rights); 
Kott v. City of Phoenix. 158 Ariz. 415, 763 P.2d 235 (1988) 
(trial court's decision to allow officer to testify who had been 
unidentified to other side before trial was reversible error 
since admission of evidence was erroneous and error not 
harmless). 
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Allen K. Young, Esq. 
Randy S. Kester, Esq. 
YOUNG Se KESTER 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Cl/-%£-t>IL 
tyKM 
Re: Berrett v. D&RGW 
Dear Allen & Randy: 
This letter is written as a follow-up to my letters to 
you of May 12, 1989, June 2, 1989, and June 19, 1989, as well 
as our various telephone conversations in the interim. On May 
1, 1989, Judge Christensen issued his Ruling on the Railroad's 
Motion to Dismiss. Under Local Rule 4-504(1), your firm, as 
counsel for the prevailing party, was to have prepared a 
proposed order within fifteen days of the Ruling. Today, 
fifty-three days later, I finally received a proposed Order 
mailed from your office on June 21, 1989. As a consequence, we 
are finally in a position to deliver the Railroad's Answer to 
Third Amended Complaint and the Railroad's Responses to 
Plaintiff's Interrogatories and Request for Production. Copies 
of these pleadings are enclosed herewith. 
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V A N COTT, B A G LEY, C O R N W A L L & MCCARTHY 
Allen K. Young, Esq. 
June 23, 1989 
Page 2 
At the March 24, 1989 hearing, counsel represented to 
the Court that they would formulate a Scheduling Order based 
upon the time table set in the Scheduling Order for the 
February trial. On May 12, 1989, I forwarded to Randy a 
proposed form of Scheduling Order that incorporated the timing 
of the Court's previous Order. Thereafter, I heard nothing 
from either of you. I placed several calls to your office that 
were not returned. Finally, on June 1, 1989, Allen and I 
spoke. I agreed that the deadlines in the proposed Scheduling 
Order could be modified and invited him to provide me with any 
alternative dates that you might propose. I have yet to 
receive any proposed schedule. 
In my May 12, 1989 letter, I requested that you advise 
me of dates on which we could complete the depositions of your 
experts, Dr. Olsen and Mr. Leonard. This request was repeated 
in my June 2, 1989 and June 19, 1989 letters as well as in 
separate conversations with each of you. Nevertheless, you 
still have not advised us of a date on which we can complete 
these depositions. As you know, the preparation of our experts 
is in large measure dependant on their review of what your 
experts are going to say. With the new issues in the case and 
Dr. Olsen!s statement that he intends to perform a limit 
equilibrium analysis, it is essential that we complete the 
depositions to prepare our experts. 
On the subject of depositions, we have directed our 
experts to hold open the last two weeks in July, 1989 for you 
to take or complete their depositions. Nevertheless, you have 
not yet advised us of whom you wish to depose and where and 
when you would like to depose them. 
We have discussed the need for a pretrial order and 
witness lists. We especially need to know what witness you 
intend to call and what depositions you may read to the jury. 
In my June 2, 1989 letter, I requested that you provide us with 
a witness list by June 12, 1989. You indicated in conversation 
that you may call witnesses listed in the Utah Railway pretrial 
order in addition to those listed in earlier drafts of the 
pretrial order in this case. I advised you that I did not have 
a copy of the Utah Railway pretrial order and I understood that 
you would provide me with one. Nonetheless, when I received 
your letter of June 15, 1989 (posted June 21, 1989), a copy of 
the Utah Railway pretrial order was not included. Further, 
with reference to the concern expressed in that letter 
regarding our witness list, you will note that it is part of 
the draft pretrial order sent to you on June 19, 1989. 
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Allen K. Young, Esq. 
June 23, 1989 
Page 3 
According to my calculations, we are just a little 
over seven weeks away from trial. For the past six weeks, our 
office has made every effort to complete our trial 
preparation. We have not received the slightest cooperation 
from you. You have ignored phone calls and only belatedly (and 
partially) responded to letters. You have only now after some 
prodding proposed an order memorializing Judge Christensen1s 
May 1, 1989 Ruling. You have incorporated wholesale what I 
suspect is a long witness list from other litigation without 
providing us with a copy of that list and without specifying 
with whom you have talked and whom you might realistically call 
as a witness. 
Because of the problems set forth above, we have 
secured a hearing with the Court on June 27, 1989 at 4:00 p.m. 
to discuss trial preparation. It is our firm intent to see 
this case to trial on August 14, 1989. Where we have been 
denied the opportunity of full and timely discovery by reason 
of your refusal to cooperate, we will ask the Court to exclude 
evidence and/or claims. In view of the complexity of this 
matter and the enormous investment of time that has been made 
to this point, we think it unfair to our clients, the Court and 
the jury to save the most critical factual investigation for a 
last minute rush that can only result in surprise and confusion. 
ECO: 
cc: Honorable Cullen J. Christensen 
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O R I G I N A L 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT BERRETT, GERALD 
ARGYLE, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Case No. CV-86-616 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
INC., 
Defendant. 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that the above-entitled 
matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
Cullen Y. Christensen, Judge of the above-entitled Court, on 
the 27th day of June, 1989, commencing at the hour of 4:11 
o'clock p.m., at Room 310, County Courthouse Building, 51 
South University Avenue, Provo, Utah; 
That there appeared as counsel represen-
ting plaintiffs, ALLEN K. YOUNG, ESQ., and as counsel repre-
senting defendant, MICHAEL F. RICHMAN, ESQ. and ERIC C. 
OLSON, ESQ. 
'WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were 
had: 
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1 Case No. CV-86-616, Berrett, et al, vs. Denver Rio Grande. 
2 Mr. Young, you are here for the plaintiffs? 
3 MR. YOUNG: Yes, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Richman, what are we 
5 here for? I don't see anything in the file. 
6 MR. RICHMAN: Well, your Honor, the 
7 reason we are here, Mr. Olson had hand-delivered to the 
8 Court last Friday a letter which he had sent to Mr. Young 
9 expressing some of the difficulties we have had with respect 
10 to getting this case prepared for trial. I don't know if the 
11 Court has had an opportunity to read that letter or not. 
12 THE COURT: Yes, I've read it. 
13 MR. RICHMAN: Okay. That's why we are 
14 here, your Honor. We want this trial to go forward on 
15 August 14, 1989. We do not want a continuance. This case 
16 is too expensive and too time-consuming. And it seems to us 
17 that it's time to stop the histrionics that have been going 
18 on in this case and time to actually get something done. 
19 And we have had tremendous difficulty with Mr. Young's office 
20 getting the information which is necessary in order for us 
21 to do our final preparation. 
22 As you know, on the defense of this case we are 
23 basically counter-punchers, we don't have the burden of going 
24 forward. But we must know what in the world the plaintiff is Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 witnesses are going to testify to, so that we can then get 
2 our experts ready. There are two mine experts, a Dr. Olsen 
3 and a Mr. Leonard, who are the only people I know of in the 
4 entire world who say the railroad did anything wrong with 
5 respect to that slide or causing the slide or anything else. 
6 While we have taken their depositions on one occasion, the 
7 occasion we took it on, if I might back up, there's something 
8 called a finite element analysis that Mr. Leonard did in 
9 conjunction with his masters thesis. It is on the basis of 
10 this finite element analysis that their two experts rendered 
11 the opinion that the railroad's cut at the bottom of the 
12 slide was a factor in causing the slide. 
13 At the time we took the depositions we didn't have 
14 any idea what a finite element analysis was. We took the 
15 depositions, got some background, and said to Mr. Leonard, 
16 "May we have your program so that we can see what you did?" 
17 We got his program. We tested his program. Now it's time 
18 to talk to Mr. Leonard and talk turkey with Mr. Leonard with 
19 respect to his programs and any failings that that program 
20 may have. For two reasons. One, it may lead to a summary 
21 judgment in this case. And for the second reason, it allows 
22 us to get our experts ready to confront anything that Mr. 
23 Leonard may saw. 
24 We have been trying for over two months to line ! Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 doing so, we have not to this date heard one word as to when 
2 we can take those depositions. With respect to the answer, 
3 excuse me, with respect to the Order of this Court which was 
4 made 53 days ago concerning the amending of a complaint. We 
5 just got the amend, we just got the order the other day, 
6 which held up discovery. We tried to put together a schedul-
7 ing order and a pre-trial conference order. And what we find 
8 out in a pre-trial on the pre-trial order is that Mr. Young 
9 has now included as witnesses everybody who is listed in the 
10 Utah Railway case versus the Denver Rio Grande, which I 
11 believe is four pages of witnesses that heretofore we had not 
12 had any knowledge of. 
13 So without accusing Mr. Young of bad faith, I'm 
14 sure he's as busy as we are, at the same time he owes a duty 
15 of responsibility to us and to the Court to aid us in an 
16 attempt to get this case tried in a proper and efficient 
17 manner. We don't think he's doing so. For that reason we 
18 have come here today to seek to enlist the aid of the Court 
19 so that we don't have to lose our trial date, because we 
20 don't want to lose our trial date. 
21 The second aspect, which is not in the letter of Mr. 
22 Olsen, is the problem that I have with the Court's Order on 
23 the motion to dismiss. As I read that Order, Mr. Young would 
24 be permitted to say that we were negligent for failing to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 hadn't, even though our cuts had absolutely nothing to do 
2 with the failure of the mountain. That creates major problem^ 
3 for me. And really all we need is some clarification from 
4 the Court, it seems to me, that if our cut had nothing to do 
5 with that mountain falling, we don't have any more duty or 
6 responsibility to drain that mountain than do the people of 
7 Thistle, the State of Utah, or anybody who is in the vicinity 
8 of the bottom of that mountain. 
9 Only if we did something that would cause that 
10 mountain to fall down would we under the Court's Order, I 
11 believe, have any responsibility to do anything on that 
12 mountain. We may have some responsibility on the portion 
13 which we own. But we can't have any responsibility if we 
14 didn't do anything to cause the thing to come down. And what 
15 I was frankly seeking from the Court was — If I might add, 
16 also Mr. Young conceded that in the oral argument on the 
17 motion to dismiss that if our cut had nothing to do with the 
18 failure, we don't have to fix the mountain. But that's not 
19 the way the pleadings read. The pleadings read we would be 
20 negligent for failing to fix the mountain even if we didn't 
21 do anything to cause it to come down. And I was hoping that 
22 perhaps also today we could get some clarification from the 
23 Court of that. I don't know if the Court is remindful of 
24 what went on during that hearing or the specific issues Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 If the Court needs no specifics on the lack of 
2 cooperation, I would defer to Mr. Olsen, who is much more 
3 on top of it than I am. Thank you, your Honor. 
4 MR. OLSEN: If I could just mention one 
5 thing, your Honor, that did come up. I was concerned at the 
6 time that we argued the motion to dismiss that we get these 
7 depositions on schedule. And I asked Mr. Kester at that time 
8 to get me some dates, and have continued now from March until 
9 today in June, and have no dates. 
10 Also we were concerned at that time, and I think 
11 what is mentioned during the hearing, that we get a scheduling 
12 order here. And I think the Court directed us to use the 
13 previous scheduling order as a guideline. So some days after 
14 the Court issued its ruling, I submitted to Mr. Kester a 
15 proposed scheduling order. Mr. Young did call -- on that 
16 order but did never determine any proposed dates. We have 
17 no schedule except we have an August 14 trial date. And 
18 certainly that's not our wish to have things up in the air. 
19 I'm sure itfs not the Court's wish. But unless I can get 
20 some agreement from counsel, we have not even a discovery cut-) 
21 off motion, cutoff date by which voir dire and jury instruc-
22 tions will be submitted, trial brief, pre-trial order. And 
23 I'm concerned that we get these dates agreed, to have some 
24 deadlines to shoot for. And I would like to think that Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 been two months now. And I have had numerous phone calls 
2 not returned, numerous letters not responded to. And I can 
3 count, you know, two calls total from Mr. Young's office in 
4 that period of time and one meeting, which I initiated, on 
5 Friday when I delivered my letter to them. And I met with 
6 I Mr. Kester. I don't mean to point any fingers. 
7 We are at a point where, if we are going to be 
8 ready on August 14th and have a fair chance to defend ourself. 
9 We've got to get things solidified as to schedule. 
10 Mr. Richman did mention that, I guess, five pages 
11 of pre-trial order in this Utah Railway case. And if the 
12 Court remembers, that was a Federal case in which the two 
13 railroads -- were at odds over who is going to pay the bill 
14 for the cleanup down there. And because our firm represents 
15 both plaintiff and defendant on a former retainer basis, we 
16 have -- this litigation and other firms handle it theirself. 
17 I have not had ready access to any of the materials in that 
18 case and have made very little attempt to familiarize myself 
19 with them. That is up until three or four months ago. The 
20 issues in this case were entirely different. 
21 Mr. Kester gave me on Friday this list. I count, 
22 looking at it, approximately thirty people. Of those approxi-
23 mately 25 are in addition to those already named in this pre-
24 trial order draft that has been framed by counsel before the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 names. And I don't know in looking at this how many of these 
2 people Mr. Young and Mr. Kester are serious about calling in 
3 the case. And are they planning to use some of these depo-
4 sitions? And if so, we'd like to have copies of those to 
5 know if there is something we need to do to clarify the 
6 record on our behalf. 
7 We are six weeks away from trial as of this coming 
8 Monday, and that's a scary situation to find yourself in. 
9 And I think we are entitled at a minimum to get a commitment 
10 out of Mr. Young, and a clear statement of who he's really 
11 going to call as witnesses so we can take whatever additional 
12 discovery might be appropriate and know what to expect for 
13 trial. And I think that's the minimum. And I think we were 
14 entitled to that many weeks ago. And I apologize to having 
15 to draw the Court into this in order to get that information. 
16 THE COURT: Well, let's find out what 
17 your claim is, Mr. Young. 
18 MR. YOUNG: Thank you, your Honor. Your 
19 Honor, Mr. Kester has left for Seattle on another matter 
20 today, and I cannot speak for him and his relationship with 
21 Mr. Olsen. I would like to state a couple of things. Mr. 
22 Olsen is a good letter writer, and I need to become a better 
23 letter writer, and everytime Mr. Olsen doesn't provide some-
24 thing that I've requested I need to begin to writing letters Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 Your Honor, the truth of the matter is that I have 
2 been very busy on the USX case and have turned much of the 
3 labor over to Mr. Kester. On the other hand, when I got this 
4 letter, after I quit steaming I went to the records, went to 
5 the documents, went to everything I could do after getting 
6 back from Pittsburg Saturday, worked on this case yesterday 
7 and worked on this case today. Had some motions, had some 
8 orders to compel, have a motion to continue this trial, your 
9 Honor. And Ifm willing to have that heard today or give Mr. 
10 Olsen an opportunity to respond to it and we can talk about 
11 it another time. 
12 But I would like to point out a couple of things. 
13 Your Honor, in 1987 we asked in interrogatories the defen-
14 dants if anyone had made a similar claim that we had made 
15 against the railroad. Their answer in those interrogatories, 
16 I!ve attached a copy of this to my motion to compel, your 
17 Honor, which I provided to the Court and counsel, was that 
18 there wasn't. We subsequently learned that there was the 
19 other lawsuit. 
20 Now counsel says they'd certainly like a copy of 
21 the depositions in that case that we may intend to use. 
22 Counsel represents the Utah Railway, represented the Denver 
23 & Rio Grande Railroad. And I have today here a copy of a 
24 notice of deposition for all ranchers dealing with that case Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 records deposition in that case, so I can get those records 
2 come next Wednesday. 
3 Their client, both parties to that litigation were 
4 their clients. They reason they didnft, weren't directly 
5 involved is because the president of the railroad was the 
6 president of their law firm, the president of Utah Railway. 
7 We have sought to find out about that case for over two 
8 years. They won't tell us a word about it. So we are going 
9 to have to notice up depositions. 
10 Your Honor, I have brought a list that is two 
11 pages, well, a page long. 
12 MR. RICHMAN: Your Honor, this is, if 
13 this is with respect to a motion for continuance, I do object 
14 to this. I find this totally irrelevant. 
15 THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to con-
16 tinue this case, counsel. You've fiddled around here long 
17 enough. I want to know who you are going to call, Mr. Young. 
18 You certainly have known about this lawsuit for a long time. 
19 It's a Federal case, it's got to be filed some place. 
20 MR. OLSEN: Your Honor, I remember in 
21 effect we, we talked about it, Mr. Young represented from the 
22 court that he had all the records coming over from Denver. 
23 THE COURT: Well, let me hear him. 
24 MR. YOUNG: Thank you very much, your Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 --in Denver. The expense of that is prohabitive to my 
2 clients. The more I've rationalized and thought about this 
3 case, your Honor, I realize that these people represent the 
4 railroad, who was the defendant in this action, these people 
5 represent the plaintiffs who were the plaintiffs in that 
6 action, and therefore I intend and will and hereby do serve 
7 a notice of document, production of documents, deposition on 
8 them for next Wednesday. And I'll see that that's recorded 
9 with the Court. So that we can get copies of those. 
10 Your Honor, the reason that I have listed each and 
11 every person that was listed by the plaintiffs in that case 
12 is I can only believe that those people have information abou^: 
13 the negligence of the defendant. The defendant knows that, 
14 the railroad knows that these people who represent both the 
15 Utah Railway and the Denver & Rio Grande know that until I 
16 can talk to them and see their depositions, most of those 
17 peoples1 depositions were taken in that case, and until I 
18 can read those depositions, counsel says he doesn't have 
19 them, I think he does, but if he doesn't, it's his client, 
20 on both sides, so he can certainly have them and have them 
21 available for me. 
22 I also, your Honor, have prepared a motion to com-
23 J pel discovery against these defendants. In this matter there 
have been, let me give you an example. I sent out interroga-24 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 specific questions. They finally answered those, hand-
2 delivered last Friday afternoon, over six months. And then 
3 they answer them as follows. I asked for all sorts of 
4 records by Shannon & Wilson. I asked for all sorts of photo-
5 graphs. Let me give you an example, your Honor. Mr. Ozment, 
6 who is a key player in this whole case, took a whole bunch 
7 of photographs of this scene. I requested all of the photo-
8 graphs Mr. Ozment took. Counsel, in the answers to interro-
9 gatories, tells me he didn't take them on behalf of the rail-
10 road, he was at that point in time on his own behalf. Well, 
11 first of all in his deposition Mr. Ozment is working for 
12 the railroad 24 hours a day. And we asked him on whose 
13 behalf he took them. And he said, ffI don't know." Secondly, 
14 I suspect we'll see some of those on behalf of the defendant 
15 when we get to trial. We are entitled to those. 
16 At Dr. Morgenstern1s deposition, your Honor, we 
17 asked for a copy of a deposition in another slide case. Mr. 
18 Olson said, "I'll provide that to you." That was in November 
19 of 1988. He has not provided that. Our experts cannot come 
20 to conclusions until all of the discovery we have asked them 
21 to provide be made available to us, and all of the -- And I 
22 don't think that Mr. Olson has an opportunity to respond to 
23 my motion to compel. I think he has an opportunity to re-
24 spond to these questions, when he said, "sure, I'll get that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 I asked Mr. Hiltz, "Can I have your CV so I can 
2 look it over and prepare -- witnesses?" "Sure, I'll get that 
3 to you." Never has been done. He hasn't provided anything 
4 that he's agreed to provide pursuant to the depositions. He 
5 hasn't provided Mr. Morgenstern's deposition. Let me, I've 
6 got about 12 or 14 things I've listed in this motion to com-
7 pel. 
8 Another thing I asked them in 1988 or 1987, who 
9 the experts they consulted, the primary experts they consult-
10 ed were. They told me about Shannon & Wilson who, in Mr. 
11 Wilson's deposition said, "We were first retained in 1983." 
12 Thile through all our discovery and the limited discovery 
13 that we have been able to do in the Utah Railway case, we 
14 find out they had a man named Eublacker. So we asked them 
15 again about that and we say, "Wasn't Eublacker retained by 
16 you as an engineer?" And they say, "Yes." And we say, "Give 
17 us all of his reports to you and your reports to him as an 
18 engineer." They say, "It's not relevant." We want all of 
19 those reports. We think they are relevant. We think they 
20 have to do with slides. We think they have to do with pre-
21 notice of slides. We think they have to do with their 
22 ability to come in here and do something about this slide 
23 mass. And we want those documents. Our experts need those 
24 documents. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 preparation for discovery. It was my understanding that the 
2 reason that the defendants wanted to take the depositions 
3 of Mr. Leonard and Mr. Olsen were this: Mr. Olsen in his 
4 deposition said he may complete an area of discovery with 
5 regard to this I believe it's the finite analysis. Mr. 
6 Leonard already gave them that information. Their deposi-
7 tions have already been taken. They can prepare to cross 
8 examine them based on the depositions already taken. I 
9 talked to Mr. Olsen yesterday. Mr. Olsen is available for 
10 depositions later if the Court so instructs. But he has not 
11 completed his finite analysis at this point in time. He 
12 wants to see Dr. Morgenstern1s books. He wants to see Dr. 
13 Morgenstern1s articles. He wants to see Dr. Morgenstern1s 
14 reports on this matter, in the Utah State Rail case, which 
15 Mr. Olson has agreed to give us, the reports on the Utah 
16 Railway case. He wants to see Mr. Slausen's reports. And 
17 then he says he can go forward and do these other studies 
18 that he can prepare. 
19 I don't know under the rules if they are allowed to 
20 take an expert's deposition twice. Dr. Olsen is available 
21 on the 19th or 20th of July, in case he needs to be available\ 
22 Mr. Leonard said almost anytime in July he's available. I 
23 don't think the purpose of a deposition, your Honor, is to 
24 take a deposition, break it down and retake a deposition. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 They had an opportunity to take him, I won't make a big 
2 deal about retaking Dr. Morgenstern, I111 deal with him 
3 when he comes to Utah, if I have the reports he's written 
4 and if I have his vitae and those other documents that counsel! 
5 agreed over a year ago, and some not a year ago, some in 
6 November of '88, to provide for us. Your Honor, respectfully,] 
7 and then I'll sit down and shut up. 
8 As an officer of the Court, I must tell you that 
9 I have been working significantly all of the time on my 
10 USX case, and therefore have turned this case primarily over 
11 to Mr. Kester. The firm of Spence, Moriarity & Schuster 
12 told me that they would come in and try this case for us 
13 and prepare it and get it going. I talked to Mr. Moriarity, 
14 and Mr. Moriarity indicated that he could not do it in August 
15 and he would not even get involved if the trial was going to 
16 be in August. And I told him the judge had set the trial in 
17 August and there is nothing I can do about that. 
18 It is my opinion, your Honor, that until we have 
19 all of the records of that negligence action that was settled 
20 in Salt Lake City which they have access to and I can go over 
21 all of those things including the witnesses and the deposi-
22 tions, in candor, your Honor, both of those parties had deep 
23 pockets, both of those parties hired excellent witnesses, 
24 both of those parties in -- hires an expert out of Southern Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 Both of them spent a lot of money in preparation for this 
2 case that my people have not been able to afford. I need 
3 to see those records. I need to see those depositions. Then 
4 I can tell who are those people he intends to call. I can't 
5 do it until I see them. I admit that that is my fault for 
6 not having served this records deposition earlier. I intend 
7 to have it by next Wednesday. 
8 If the Court makes us go forward in August, we'll 
9 be ready. But I do move at this point in time, and I'd be 
10 happy to have counsel respond to it, to continue on the basis 
11 that discovery is not complete until I can get those. Until 
12 they fulfill their commitment that they made in the deposi-
13 tions, until they answer the interrogatories that we have 
14 propounded, we can't be ready and our experts can't be ready. 
15 THE COURT: Now, Mr. Richman. 
16 MR. RICHMAN: Your Honor, I think we are 
17 as close to a Rule 11 as I've ever heard. Today we have a 
18 total amendment to the complaint, throwing in all new causes 
19 of action, only to find out that Mr. Young really doesn't 
20 have any evidence until we supply him with certain informa-
21 tion. It seems to me there comes a point in time that if you 
22 are going to put something down on a piece of paper which 
23 causes an increase in the litigation, causes a continuance 
24 in the litigation, and don't have one scintilla of evidence Digitized by the H ward W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 But it seems to me that what we have got here, 
2 especially with Leonard and Olsen, they make certain state-
3 ments and then provide us with what's called this "finite 
4 element analysis," which is a computer program; we take the 
5 computer program and we run it, and that creates new question^ 
6 for us with respect to the way we ran it. 
7 What really offends me today about what Mr, Young 
8 says is we have not heard one word up until today, and we 
9 have been trying for three or four months to get these depo-
10 sitions, not one word up till today that they may hesitate 
11 in permitting us to take those depositions. They always 
12 said, "We'll get a date, we'll get you a date." So we jerk 
13 around for four months until finally we have to come into 
14 this court and ask for help, when in fact they are thinking 
15 maybe they are not going to let us do it at all, which 
16 requires us to make some motion to compel. To me that is a 
17 total lack of integrity with respect to the judicial process 
18 by Mr. Young's office. I can't comment specifically about 
19 I some of the things that purportedly Mr. Olson was supposed to 
20 supply. I would like to have Mr. Olson have an opportunity 
21 to talk about it. 
22 But a continuance at this date, your Honor, I think 
23 is a total travesty of justice, and I think Mr. Young has 
24 played fast and loose with us. Hopefully, he hasn't done so Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 for us to be ready for trial, and we'll strenuously oppose 
2 any further continuance in this case, 
3 MR. OLSON: Just on the specifics, your 
4 Honor, since Mr. Young has now and for the first time to my 
5 hearing made comment about certain things he said he didn't 
6 get. 
7 He mentioned, first of all, the answer to the 
8 December '88 interrogatories. The Court will recall the 
9 discovery cutoff on that was December 31. And interrogatorie^ 
10 were filed less than 30 days before that cutoff. And until 
11 the time that the Court ruled there should be an amendment 
12 in February, there was no obligation for us to respond to 
13 these interrogatories, they were not --
14 When the amendment was proposed and we made our 
15 motion to dismiss, I advised counsel, and Mr. Young is, on 
16 several occasions -- respond in interrogatories which dealt 
17 with the April when and if the Court rules against us on the 
18 motion to dismiss. The Court ruled against us approximately 
19 60 days ago. On Friday I finally got the order that would 
20 memorialize that ruling. And on Friday I delivered those 
21 interrogatories to Mr. Kester, and I did exactly what the 
22 rules of procedure -- If they wanted them any sooner, they 
23 could have proposed that order 55 days ago. There was no-
24 thing that prevented them, when they would have received the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 three lines long as it was. I don't know what happened 
2 there. I have been at a loss, I haven't been able to --
3 And I don't even know if the Court has actually entered the 
4 order yet, but we want to get the case moving along. 
5 THE COURT: Well, I haven't entered 
6 because the time under the rules hasn't expired for you to 
7 object if you want to. 
8 MR. OLSON: Well, our feeling was to get 
9 these other things on file, because frankly we have no 
10 objection, your Honor. We are willing to have that entered 
11 as stated, however with tlie copy and the clarifications that 
12 Mr. Leonard made that might appropriately be addressed in 
13 that. 
14 Second, the Morgenstern deposition in another case, 
15 I told Mr. Young at the time Mr. Morgenstern thought he had 
16 a copy of that deposition. He does not. I told Allen on 
17 the phone less than a month ago about that fact. I gave him 
18 the name of the case and the attorneys that were involved 
19 and they can call them up and get. But I have no obligation 
20 to give them that when it's not been in my possession or in 
21 the -- advised them that I could not keep because the -- he 
22 said he had a copy of his deposition but they can get it. I 
23 assume it's a phone call away, if they talk to the right 
24 people. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 proposed analysis of the slide. That was a year ago that he 
2 told me he was going to do some limit equilibrium analysis 
3 of the slide, and he indicated that he was going to proceed 
4 to do it. They tell us now with less than six weeks to trial 
5 that analysis isnft completed. Ifm at a loss to know why 
6 that is. 
7 There's reference to a report by our expert, Dr. 
8 Morgenstern, in the Utah Railroad case. They know full well 
9 from his deposition that no written report was prepared in 
10 the Utah Railroad case. I've advised Randy of that indepen-
11 dently on the phone. After talking further with Dr. 
12 Morgenstern, the fact is there's nothing to give. And that's 
13 why they received nothing. And I just, you know, every point 
14 that Allen has brought out here, the question of the records 
15 in that Federal Court litigation, there's never been a 
16 request made to -- directly to give him those. Our firm 
17 couldn't handle it. We couldn't. What we've got to do is 
18 to go to other counsel and ask them to dig out, if they want 
19 to. I'll be happy to call either the -- and say Mr. Young 
20 will be in touch with you and as far as we are concerned you 
21 are authorized to provide him with the depositions in that 
22 case and pleadings in that case, the things he would have 
23 found had he had access to the records in Denver. But that 
24 request has never been made to me. Now they want to take a Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter L w Library, J. Reuben Clark La  School, BYU. 
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1 we have to prepare. I think that's a major imposition. But 
2 we'll do our best to make that available to them. Now that 
3 we know they want the, all people have to do is ask, and 
4 Allen knows full well that I've talked to him on the phone 
5 and talked to Randy on the phone on nearly every one of 
6 these points, and I think this is just an attempt to try and 
7 shift the focus from their lack of cooperation, their lacking\ 
8 to somehow suggest that this is a*two-way street. And I 
9 state, your Honor, that we have bent over backwards to make 
10 sure it is a two-way street, have tried to give them every 
11 opportunity to similarly comply. 
12 MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, just to summarize 
13 I will file this motion to compel. We can talk about each 
14 and everyone of those issues at a time when each and everyone 
15 of these people have opportunity to respond to it. 
16 In regards to a telephone call with Mr. Olson 
17 where he told me Mr., Dr. Morgenstern, is simply, that's not 
18 true. 
19 THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to 
20 decide which one of you has a short memory. 
21 MR. YOUNG: He may have talked to Mr. 
22 Kester. 
23 THE COURT: Nothing before me that I 
24 see that I can rule on today except to indicate to you I'm Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 event. And therefs nothing before the Court except some 
2 generalities that you talked about. I do have a date of 
3 July 19th and the 20th that you can take these depositions 
4 of these persons that you've indicated. And I suggest that 
5 you get your notices out and get those depositions taken. 
6 I don't know what else to do with you, counsel, except to 
7 direct you to the Rules of Civil Procedure and have you 
8 follow it in writing, and that's about all I can do. Simply 
9 make your motions, I'll rule on them as they are presented. 
10 I have nothing before me today to consider. I'm disappointed 
11 in the way that the matter is going. But it appears to me 
12 that there's been adequate time for all of this to have been 
13 taken care of. 
14 If you need to make your record, get your motions 
15 filed so that whatever I do you've got some basis on which 
16 you can take the matter up to higher levels. If you are 
17 satisfied with what I do, then I suppose one or the other 
18 of you is going to be, maybe both of you will be, but in 
19 any event I don't know that I want to get into a position of 
20 having to assess your individual reputations and the truth-
21 fulness as to what you've done. Put it in a form of your 
22 motions. 
23 My expectation was that when this trial date was 
24 continued that the scheduling order would have just been Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 extended. And that that shouldn't have been too much of a 
2 problem. 
3 In answer to your question, Mr. Richman, it does 
4 appear to me that the basis of their claim for any 1983, 
5 prior 1983 matters have got to be based on negligence. 
6 Obviously, they are going to have to prove that he did some-
7 thing that was wrong. Otherwise, they don't have any stand-
8 ing. But if they have got evidence and can establish it or 
9 prove it by the upsetting the toe or perpetuating that cir-
10 cumstance, that that was a contributing factor, then maybe 
11 they've got, what I intended to say, I don't know if they've 
12 got any evidence, then I think they ought to have a right to 
13 present it. But they've surely got to show that something 
14 that the railroad or someone for whom they are responsible 
15 was negligent in what they do. Either in, in perpetuating 
16 the situation or in initially precipitating it. I don't know 
17 what the evidence is, and I expect that's what we are going 
18 to try to find out at this trial. 
19 MR. RICHMAN: I appreciate this, your 
20 Honor. I want the Court to know that we didn't come here to 
21 seek to impose sanctions on Mr. Young or, frankly, to get the 
22 Court to render any orders. What we thought we might accom-
23 plish by this is, frankly, make this a kind of a status 
24 conference so the Court knows where things are going. Digitized by the Howard W. Hun er Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 not goint anywhere at this point very satisfactorily. And 
2 it's obvious, Mr. Young, I can see this, that if you are 
3 overburdened in what you are doing and you've got, Mr. 
4 Kester is a capable person, whether or not he's taking care 
5 of the office to support you while you take care of another 
6 case, I don't know. I suspect that that may be part of the 
7 problem. You've got, you are out of there and you are not 
8 in that sense able to devote enough time to help with all 
9 whatever else that you may have going. But I can't solve 
10 that problem. But it appears to me that you are competent 
11 counsel, all of you, and certainly you ought to be able to 
12 sit down and resolve these things. And if you can't, all 
13 I can suggest to you, you've got rules of civil procedure, 
14 and we'll have to go by the book and let the chips fall where 
15 they may. I hate to see that. Lot's of times we can accom-
16 plish a great deal more by cooperation than otherwise. But 
17 when that fails then we have a rule to fall back on we have t 
18 resort to. 
19 So I'm going to direct that whatever motions you 
20 are going to file that, either to compel or any purpose, 
21 that we ought to have those filed no later than ten days from 
22 today. So let's get this up to the snubbing post. And I'll 
23 try to rule on it. But I'm not going to grant your motion to 
24 continue this trial, Mr. Young, at least at this point. And Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 calendar to take two weeks now that I can't fill at this 
2 late date; counsel say, well, I can't, I want an early trial 
3 date,you give them that, how long do you mean or next week, 
4 no, no can't do that, no; what you've done is to put at 
5 least two weeks of the Court's time that's going to be lost 
6 or wasted. Not necessarily wasted, I can find things to do. 
7 But it doesn't satisfy the public in getting their cases 
8 heard and taken care of. 
9 So I'm very reluctant to even contemplate such a 
10 possibility. I want this case tried. And your clients are 
11 entitled to have it tried. And if the inability to get it 
12 tried is because there's some lack of cooperation between 
13 you, that's unfortunate. 
14 So file your papers, and we'll get at them as 
15 quickly as we can. 
16 MR. OLSON: Your Honor, one issue, a 
17 scheduling order. Would you like us to get agreement in ten 
18 days and submit something to the Court? 
19 THE COURT: Yes. Let's get something in 
20 writing, men, so that whatever happens that you've got, if 
21 you are satisfied with what takes place, you've got a record 
22 on which you can take it up and protect yourselves in that 
23 regard. 
24 MR. OLSON: Would the same be true with Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 ten days? 
2 THE COURT: Yes, I want this all done. 
3 MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, when the trial 
4 was scheduled in February Mr. Olson and Mr. Kester attempted 
5 to come up with a pre-trial order. And it was my impression, 
6 and I've discussed this with Mr. Olson since then and told 
7 him that I believe it's impossible. 
8 THE COURT: Why is it impossible? 
9 MR. YOUNG: Well, because I think that 
10 they think that we tried to put things in there, and we 
11 definitely think they tried to put things in there, that 
12 aren't really the issues at fact and try to misconstrue what 
13 the issues are. And we tried back and forth and back and 
14 forth, and finally we just threw up our hands and said, look, 
15 we can't agree with you on what the issues are here, we think 
16 they are simply, we thing they are negligence, and we think 
17 the defendant was negligent and they caused the injury that 
18 these people, they were a cause of the injury to these 
19 people. And if they want to put a pre-trial order that that' 
20 the situation, then we'll be happy to. But Mr. Olson seems 
21 to want to put things in there as uncontrovered facts that 
22 certainly are contested. 
23 THE COURT: Well, it seems to the Court 
24 that if you are in dispute as to whether they are agreed on, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir. 
2 THE COURT: That seems rather elementary 
3 if you don't, and I've never been able to understand why two 
4 lawyers can't sit down and agree that one says this is what 
5 I claim and the other says this is what I claim. Maybe that 
6 is expecting too much. But I can't for the life of me see 
7 why that can't be done, that your pre-trial order cannot set 
8 forth those things that you legitimately and honestly claim 
9 and at least narrow it down to some extent. If you can't 
10 narrow it down any greater than the pleadings and the com-
11 plaint and the answer, why maybe you don't accomplish a heck 
12 of a lot. But I would expect that you ought to be able to 
13 do better than that. 
14 MR. OLSON: Your Honor, just so it's 
15 clear here, the record: Mr. Young has in his possession 
16 and has probably for ten-fifteen days a draft pre-trial order 
17 that includes everything he ever asked to include and anything 
18 we ever asked to include, and there's one disputed fact in 
19 the entire thing and everything else is undisputed. As we 
20 rightly acknowledge, we aren't in agreement on a lot of 
21 things. I put that to his office and awaited a response. 
22 I think it's basically been everybody -- in a pre-trial 
23 order. And since we've looked at it and talked about it, 
24 I'm sure we could agree that we disagree and submit it to the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 THE COURT: Well, what I'm concerned 
2 about are these witnesses. Why can't you delineate who it 
3 is you are going to call? You don't know at this point, Mr. 
4 Young? 
5 MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, we have delinea-
6 ted the experts and people and individuals that we do intend 
7 to call, in terms of Dr. Olsen and Dr. Leonard and others. 
8 There is a plethora of witnesses that were listed by the 
9 plaintiffs in that suit whom I've got to talk to in the 
10 next 40 days, and they say some of things --
11 THE COURT: You've got to talk to them a 
12 lot sooner than that, Mr. Young. I say, you'd better find 
13 out and talk to them within the next ten or fifteen days. 
14 MR. YOUNG: Well, as soon as I get the 
15 deposition in that other suit, I think we'll have talked to 
16 most of them, because most of them have had their depositions 
17 taken. That's the point. For instance --
18 THE COURT: The trouble is for reasons 
19 that may be important, put off doing what ought to have been 
20 done a long time ago. And that in my judgment isn't any 
21 reason to continue this lawsuit, if you haven't done the 
22 legwork that you ought to have done. And you each are 
23 entitled to know who it is you are legitimately going to call. 
24 Do that you don't end up in surprises. And if you don't dis-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 can do is to make an order they cannot be permitted to 
2 testify. And that's unfortunate. So that you say they've 
3 got these records. If they are, if they don't have them 
4 and they are as easily available to you as to them, there's 
5 no reason to expect that they have to produce them. 
6 MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, they are the 
7 defendant. They are Denver & Rio Grande Railroad. 
8 THE COURT: That may be. But if they 
9 don't represent these people in this lawsuit, then they may 
10 not be in a position to do anything about it. So that's, 
11 they may have a representation on other matters, but if they 
12 are not counsel on these lawsuits and somebody else repre-
13 sents them, there's where you need to go. 
14 MR. RICHMAN: Your Honor, I'd like just 
15 to make an oral motion to quash this deposition next 
16 Wednesday. I represent to Mr. Young we do not have these 
17 documents. We'll of course call counsel and on that case 
18 and advise them that if they want to turn it over to Mr. 
19 Young we have no objection to doing that. But they have 
20 noticed now our custodian of records, and we just don't have 
21 the records. 
22 THE COURT: Then say I don't have any 
23 documents. That's all you can do if that's what you are --
24 MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, may I speak to Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 THE COURT: Yes. 
2 MR. YOUNG: I've sued companies, I've 
3 sued Ford Motors, General Motors, and I've asked those 
4 companies for the records of a certain case or cases. The 
5 law firm that deals with Ford Motor Company may be a Salt 
6 Lake law firm. The Ford Motor Company, the defendant has 
7 access to its documents. And litigation filings, it would 
8 be like if you sued me, your Honor, and I hired Mr. Olson 
9 to represent him, and Mr. Olson said, well, your Honor, Mr. 
10 Young may have the documents but I don't because I didn't let 
11 him in that litigation, he's the one that goes to his client 
12 and says get those records, they are yours, you paid for 
13 them, you own them, get them. Now I suppose what I'll do, 
14 too, is serve depositions subpoenas on both other law firms 
15 and see where that gets me. But --
16 THE COURT: Well, you do, I say, if you 
17 can't agree --
18 MR. YOUNG: We'll follow the rules. 
19 THE COURT: And you follow the rules, 
20 then we'll have to decide. I don't know what else to tell 
21 you. 
22 MR. OLSON: I'm more than happy to work 
23 out of here now and if I can reach the appropriate -- that 
24 as far as we are concerned, he can have access to those Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 THE COURT: Well, I do think this, that 
2 as general counsel for these people, if you have authority 
3 or can get form your client records that are discoverable, 
4 you ought to produce them. 
5 MR. OLSON: Their attorneys have them. 
6 THE COURT: I'm not deciding that at 
7 this point. 
8 MR. OLSON: I'm offering to do that. I 
9 think it's as simple as a phone call to the proper person. 
10 THE COURT: What I say, it seems to me 
11 a lot of this is simple if you'll just do it. 
12 MR. OLSON: We don't know -- we don't 
13 know anything nor --
14 MR. YOUNG: I've asked the other attorney^ 
15 to talk to me about this and never thought --
16 MR. OLSON: He's never asked me to talk 
17 to him. 
18 THE COURT: Well, he's can't you two 
19 discuss -- and so I suggest you ask him. 
20 MR. YOUNG: I, here on the record, ask 
21 him. 
22 MR. OLSON: I'll go to the phone right 
23 now. 
24 THE COURT: Well, I'll grant your request. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 MR. YOUNG: Thank you, your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Read through your papers, 
3 then do what we can. 
4 I (WHEREUPON, the Court recessed at 4:58 o'clock p.m.;) 
5 
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C O P Y 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT BERRETT, GERALD 
ARGYLE, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Civil No. CV-86-616 
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING 
DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
INC., 
Defendant. 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that the above-entitled 
matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
Cullen Y. Christensen, Judge of the above-entitled Court, on 
the 3rd day of August, 1989, commencing at the hour of 12:34 
o'clock p.m., at Room 310, County Courthouse, 51 South 
University, Provo, Utah; 
That there appeared as counsel represen-
ting plaintiffs, ALLEN K. YOUNG, ESQ., and as counsel repre-
senting defendant, MICHAEL F. RICHMAN, ESQ. and ERIC C. 
OLSON, ESQ. 
WHEREFORE, the following proceedings were 
had: 
THE COURT: The matter before the Court Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1 is Case No. CV-86-616, Berrett, et al., vs. Denver & Rio 
2 Grande Western Railroad. 
3 Mr. Young, you are appearing for the plaintiff? 
4 MR. YOUNG: I am, your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: And Mr. Olson and Mr. Richman, 
6 for the defendants? 
7 MR. OLSON: Yes, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: This matter comes to the 
9 Court by way of your motion, Mr. Olson. 
10 MR. OLSON: Yes, your Honor. 
11 MR. YOUNG: Mr. Olson, could you use that 
12 podium? 
13 (off the record) 
14 THE COURT: All right. 
15 MR. OLSON: Your Honor, briefly, just a 
16 little background. This motion is brought as a result of a 
17 witness list that was provided to our office on Tuesday, 
18 August the 1st, by Mr. Young. The history, I guess, of that 
19 witness list deserves a little explanation. 
20 You'll recall in January Mr. Young and I appeared 
21 before the Court with respect to the question of whether or 
22 not in the contemplated February trial the issue of pre-April 
23 1983 negligence would be bef ore the jury. And after some 
24 discussion, Mr. Young indicated, among other things, that he 
OR I had hpeome aware of litigation that occurred sometime ago Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 between the railroad and Utah Railway, which we call the Utah 
2 Railway Litigation, down in Federal Court. And he indicated 
3 that he was getting those files and planned to review them 
4 and wanted to go forward with the trial date. But the trial 
5 date was putoff until August 14. In connection with that 
6 February trial date, the Court will remember there was a 
7 scheduling order. As part of that scheduling order, I recall 
8 that Mr. Young, and perhaps Mr. Kester, sat down in the 
9 Court's chambers, and that was back in October of '88, we 
10 came up with a series of schedules by which certain things 
11 had to be done. One of those items was that a witness list 
12 would be exchanged by November 14th. And if my calculations 
13 are right, that's approximately, nearly 100 days before the 
14 trial date. When the Court gave Mr. Young leave to amend 
15 his pleadings and the various motions had been filed and 
16 rulings had been made on our motion to dismiss. I forwarded 
17 to Mr. Young a draft proposed scheduling order basically 
18 incorporating the same deadlines that had been implicit in 
19 the previous scheduling order. But just moving them into 
20 the August 14th time frame I did, I think, save twenty days 
21 off of the witness list. Because it was clear that by the time) 
22 they got the proposed order that I was tendering to him that 
23 time period, 90-day time period would have run. I heard 
24 nothing back from them at all with respect to that scheduling 
t-Mncrs stand today, there is no scheduling ryyry ri *y o 
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1 order in effect in this case. 
2 However, it has been our concern for a month now, 
3 since that new, that new data was available to Mr, Young, 
4 according to what he said in February; our concern was what oi\ 
5 that, if any, he is going to use. Because the railroad is 
6 rather unusual in that respect, since it was a participant 
7 in that litigation and, arguably, has to answer for whatever 
8 -- happen to be generated in that, and otherwise make admis-
9 sions whether it was properly represented. 
10 So it has been a matter of concern for sometime. 
11 And I've raised it for Mr. Young and Mr. Kester on various 
12 occasions for us to know definitively what their witness 
13 list was; what, if any, materials they chose to use from the 
14 Utah Railway case. It came as something of a surprise to 
15 us, in June of this year, when we were before this Court on 
16 a prior occasion and Mr. Young indicated he still had not 
17 obtained the Utah Railway material. And at that time we 
18 talked with, as promised here in court, talked with the 
19 counsel that handled that litigation and made available to 
20 to Mr. Young various boxes of pleadings and depositions, in-
21 eluded with seven large boxes of depositions. Total deposi-
22 tions I think numbered in the neighborhood of around 73. 
23 When I received Mr. Young's -- let me back up and just mentiorj 
24 one other thing. 
2f5
 ' About a month ago, I continued to express my inter-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 est with Mr. Young in getting his definitive witness list. 
2 And at that time he hedged and hedged, and I finally said 
3 "well, can you get it to me by August the 1st?" We set a 
4 sort of an outside date. And he indicated that he thought 
5 he could probably do that. I made no promises that that was 
6 an acceptable date until I had seen what was on the witness 
7 list. But I assumed from what he was saying there might be 
8 one or two additional people at least. That was the impres-
9 sion I got. And I certainly don't think that he necessarily 
10 said that insomuch as witnesses are -- on Tuesday when we 
11 received this witness list we had been going by a list that 
12 had been generated some months before. And to that list had 
13 been added five individuals, excuse me, seven individuals 
14 as may-call witnesses. 
15 And in addition to that a Mr. Shroder; an expert 
16 who wrote a paper sometime ago; and a Mr. Hinsie; two gentle-
17 men by the name of Archuletta; and a Mr. Vincent who is a 
18 former official with the, and as I understand, the Utah 
19 Department of Transportation; also a local individual down 
20 here in Spanish Fork. In addition to that the list also 
21 included a list of depositions from the Utah Railway case 
22 that Mr. Young proposed to or may read to the jury. On that, 
23 with the entire roster of 73 depositions that were taken in 
24 the Utah Railway case, that's seven boxes worth, not counting 
oc I ovhihifs. And I asked Mr. Young if he was, could be any more 
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1 specific as to what portions of the depositions, which 
2 depositions he could contemplate using. And he indicated 
3 that, at that time he was rather confident as to two indivi-
4 duals, but he could noteliminate from consideration any of 
5 those depositions. I pointed out to him that we were twelve 
6 days before trial and that that seemed rather an imposition 
7 on us since we can't read his mind or know exactly what we 
8 have to prepare for. 
9 I remember when I was in law school that in connec-
10 tion with the rules of civil procedure the comment was made 
11 or the characterization was made of "trial by ambush." I 
12 consider that the list received on Tuesday alone is the pre-
13 lude to a trial by ambush. And I think that the comsumation 
14 of that will be when Mr. Young actually makes his choices. 
15 And we are placed in a position where we can't get ahold of 
16 people to appear to clarify their testimony if that's neces-
17 sary. We haven't the time even now to go and depose the 
18 people that were previously deposed in that litigation, 
19 people whom we may not have asked any question; because they 
20 were our employees, and we had no reason to believe we 
21 couldn't call them to trial at that time, or they at least 
22 give us an opportunity to read what they have to say. Be-
23 cause, so we have 73 depositions he's identified, and some 
24 of those in our possession. That's thousands of pages. And 
o c
 -" *" -" — ' *" •"• ~«i •»'«*-i* ^  •P/^ >- no t-r\ t-ViinV T*7O p^r» ir&ad that, m u c h 
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1 less focus on what Mr. Young may or may not use at the trial. 
2 So our motion here is simply one to one of simply 
3 fairness. I think that implicit in the Court's rulings and 
4 the Court's orders up to this point has been that witnesses 
5 were to be identified in a timely fashion. We have gone 
6 forward on that assumption, with the expectancy if there 
7 was something in the way of an exigency where he couldn't 
8 identify something and he subsequently found out the dilemma, 
9 we would want to be practical and we wouldn't bring it to 
10 the Court's attention. 
11 But in the case, for instance, of Mr. Shroder, we 
12 had an individual who wrote a paper back in '76 --
13 MR. YOUNG: Sixty-seven, counsel. 
14 MR. OLSON: Excuse me. Sixty-seven. So 
15 that's, what, 22 years ago. Who was clearly identified by 
16 the expert that Mr. Young retained two years ago in this 
17 case. Not, this is no surprise. This isn't some individual 
18 who suddenly walked in off the street. This is somebody that 
19 people have known about for a considerable length of time. 
20 I don't know the particulars of why he hasn't been mentioned 
21 until now. But I do know that from what Mr. Young tells me, 
22 he's out in the East somewhere, far from where we are here. 
23 And he's going to present considerable difficulty to depose. 
24 And then we have to prepare our experts to deal with whatever 
25 it is he's cm-ino- t-n* oo*r A_J T I-
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1 what he is going to say. 
2 In the case of Mr. Hinsie, he's a well known local 
3 individual. It doesn't seem to me there is any newness about 
4 his availability to testify in this case. Well known local 
5 geologist. In the case of the other individuals, Archulettas 
6 and Mr. Vincent, I'm not sure how Mr. Young became aware of 
7 them, but again, I've heard no explanation and formed no 
8 understanding as to why he's waited until now to tell us. 
9 The only conclusion I can draw is that Mr. Young is basically 
10 popping a surprise on us. And I think that's unacceptable. 
11 It certainly presents a major problem in terms of trial 
12 preparation. Normally you prepare for trial by getting your 
13 jury instructions prepared, preparing your own witnesses, 
14 preparind documents, you went to present to the court; and 
15 that's rather a rush in and of itself. What we are doing 
16 here is what should have been done four or five months ago, 
17 after Mr. Young first found out about the existence of the 
18 Utah Railway case. And we could have completed it in a time-
19 ly fashion, and everybody would have the fair opportunity to 
20 present their case and prepare to defend the case that's 
21 going to be presented against them. We are not in that 
22 position now. And we are not even in the position to know 
23 what it is Mr. Young wants to put on with respect to the 
24 73 depositions. 
25 So we'd ask f-ha r™,r+- -?- I-T-T-- -^ 
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1 acknowledging that we are doing this on a somewhat expedited 
2 basis because of the time constraints, nevertheless, we would 
3 ask the Court to exclude the testimony that Mr. Young proposes] 
4 to add to his previous witness list; and, for that reason, to 
5 proceed on the basis that he has held out for the last six 
6 months as a basis on which he intended to proceed. 
7 I don't think that it's fair for us to have to go 
8 out and at this late date do the kind of preparation that is 
9 implicit in what he is proposing by way of new witnesses. 
10 And with respect to those depositions, I'm at a total loss 
11 to know where to start, given the fact that all I have is 
12 73 names, without the slightest idea of who he considers to 
13 have primary importance and what portions of those depositions) 
14 he intends to read. And so we'd ask the Court to exclude 
15 those materials, exclude the, strike the witnesses that have 
16 been listed, and to let this case go forward as it has been 
17 prepared for some months. 
18 Thank you. 
19 I THE COURT: Mr. Young? 
MR. YOUNG: May it please the Court: 
Your Honor, I don't know why everytime Mr. Olson and I have 
a little dispute that the next day we are here before you. 
But I guess that's the nature of this litigation. It's pro-
24 bably going to continue to be. 
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1 have had served -- Now, I didn't call your Honor back yester-
2 day afternoon, and if we need to talk about it and then 
3 schedule it tomorrow, that's fine. I have served on counsel, 
4 last night, through the Data Fax, and then this morning, a 
5 motion to compel some discovery, that I'd like to talk about 
6 as well. I think those are issues that need to be resolved. 
7 But maybe do that at the end. 
8 THE COURT: About how much time are you 
9 going to take? I've got a jury waiting. I'm not going to 
10 spend much time with you. 
11 MR. YOUNG: Okay. Your Honor, I think 
12 that this is a very important case to my clients, very impor-
13 tant case to the railroad. I think that I need, everytime 
14 Mr. Olson talks,to re-relate the history of this case. Mr. 
15 Olson and I have a fundamental disagreement about the nature 
16 of the discovery in this case, in that we believe we asked 
17 them years ago to tell us whether anybody had ever claimed 
18 that the railroad was a cause or was negligent in this case. 
19 Their response, and in their interrogatory misled us, and 
20 said that nobody had ever declared that they were negligent 
21 or a cause of this, of this slide. We relied on that. We 
22 heard through the grapevine that wasn't true. We talked with 
23 people who say "well, I had my deposition taken in a case." 
24 And so ultimately we sent someone to Denver, who got out of 
25 the Archives a rnnnlp nf *-v»^  ^ i
 AO^,-~~~ --^-« -*-
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1 that that was not a true statement, that there were negligence 
2 claims that had been made against the railroad for the Thistl^ 
3 slide by the Utah Railway. 
4 Your Honor, I don't know whether I didn't think 
5 very well or what. I have over the years contacted a Gifford 
6 Price and a Wendy Faber, who work at two different law firms 
7 in Salt Lake City. They were very unhelpful. And the reason 
8 they were very unhelpful, your Honor, is simple. The Utah 
9 Railway, who is represented by one of the Salt Lake firms, 
10 and Denver & Rio Grande, who was represented by the other, 
11 settled their differences. Now they are in bed together 
12 again. They operate the tracks and they are business partner^ 
13 again. So they didn't have any desire to injure each other. 
14 Well, I became aware of, through an independent 
15 trip to Denver, that there were lists of witnesses and lists 
16 of people whose depositions were going to be taken in that 
17 case. And Mr. Olson, who denied there was every any negli-
18 gence action, and now since on the phone says, "oh, my, there 
19 were a few more depositions about that than I ever even under-l 
20 stood"; asked me, "please tell me who your witnesses are going 
21 to be." And so I knew of that. I knew that it was out there 
22 I knew it was there. I knew there were people that alleged 
23 they were negligent. I didn't know much more about that. 
24 Because, we've gotten in a letter writing campaign with Mr. 
25 Olson in June of this vear: I adviQpH v»-f™ T O^-?^ 
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1 addition; this is, again, before I got all of these deposi-
2 tions; since the matter was settled, were never published, 
3 so therefore they weren't there. 
4 So my next move, immediately, was to Salt Lake, 
5 with Lawrence -- won't work with me, I'm going to have to 
6 specify people. And if you'll recall, Mr. Olson said that 
7 he'd help. He just related to that he'd help. He went out 
8 of town. I was required to subpoena them. He and Ms. Wendy 
9 Faber got together and decided that I should see them. And 
10 then they agreed three days later to make them available to 
11 me, after Ms. Faber and Mr. Olson had gone over them. I've 
12 got them, and I've since had to go back and get eight or ten 
13 more. I'll stipulate that Ms. Faber said it was a mistake, 
14 an oversight, they missed a bunch of them. I'll stipulate 
15 that I don't have any evidence that's not true. But I got 
16 them. 
17 But in June -- okay, weren't there. We wrote Mr. 
18 Olson a letter and told him that in addition to the witnesses 
19 that we've previously listed in the pre-trial order, it will 
20 be our intention to possibly call, because I didn't know what 
21 was there, all of the witnesses who were listed as will-calls 
22 or may-calls or whose depositions were intended to be utilize4 
23 at the trial, as they were listed in the Pre-trial Order 
24 of the Denver & Rio Grande. Because I had that face-sheet, 
25 and I gave Mr. Olson a copy of that farp-cV>o^ +- +-1--+- I-:~-~J 
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1 most of these people. 
2 In July I moved to continue this matter, because 
3 I was not ready, and because Mr. Spence couldn't aid in 
4 August. And your Honor says no, we1re going to try this 
5 case. I've put everything -- my life except this case, and 
6 went to work on this case, and have been working hard on this 
7 case. I went up there and got the 73 depositions. Patty and 
8 I have been reading everyone of those depositions. There is 
9 a myriad of information about negligence and cause and why 
10 this darn thing slipped. Utah Railway had a whole bunch of 
11 money they are owed by Denver & Rio-- And they hired experts 
12 from all over the country, from California and everywhere, to 
13 say that they are a cause of this problem. And they had 
14 individual depositions of high-ranking Denver & Rio Grande 
15 officers who I have no access to. Mr. Olson tells me they 
16 are retired. I'll have to go serve them with subpoenas over 
17 in Denver, Colorado. So I have been reading and working as 
18 hard as I can. 
19 I have been, I'll tell the Court where I, how I 
20 list all seven of the witnesses that I now possibly list. 
21 First two ex railroad employees, Burroughs, I think, and 
22 Waring are the ones I think I listed Mr. Olson won't agree 
23 ot have here. He says they are retired, so he has no control 
24 over the, subpoena them over in Denver. I don't think I have 
25 the subpoena power. I don't have thp rim* *^A «-P-P~~+- *-~ ~--
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1 them. So Ifm re-advising him that I'll read parts or all 
2 of those depositions. 
3 Your Honor, in July—and then I111 get to the other 
4 five. In July, talk about "ambush,11 I talked to Mr. Olson 
5 and I told him I'm working hard on this case, I thanked him, 
6 I said, ffyou have really made me go to work in this case, 
7 Ifm learning as much about this case as I possibly can.11 He 
8 said, "all right, let's get all of the witnesses, all of the 
9 exhibits and all of the witnesses by August the 1st." He 
10 writes me a letter. He confirms everything he does with me 
11 in a letter, in writing. And he wrote me another letter on 
12 August 12th. Ambush. I asked copies of the materials pro-
13 missed. Okay. We agreed to exchange exhibit lists no later 
14 than August 1st. I did that. At that time, "you will also 
15 supply us with your final witness list, including the identity 
16 of any depositions that you propose to read." And then he 
17 advised me, "as of July 12th you had not identified with 
18 certainty those witnesses that you planned to call or whose 
19 names do not appear in the latest draft of the pre-trial 
20 order." He didn't say "get them to me today," I didn't have 
21 them that day, as a matter of fact, "and I'll go over the 
22 other five that I've listed." I didn't have them that day. 
23 We agreed to exchange witness lists August 1st. And he's 
24 got till today to give me his. He hasn't, didn't yet today; 
2 S I h n f TA7O ami" u n f i 1 t - n ^ o i r +-•% *!* +-"U«*-
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1 All the pre-trial orders included, your Honor, an 
2 addendum that any additional witnesses that are found, the 
3 other party will be notified ten days before the trial. So 
4 under any other -- pre-trial order, I've notified him who 
5 those witnesses are. Under our agreement I've notified him 
6 who those witnesses are. And I've told him who they are. 
7 And he said, "well, I'm going to call them." 
8 And I said, "except for Mr. Shroder, who I deem 
9 an expert, you are welcome to talk to them; and if you want 
10 to make arrangements to take Dr. Shroder's deposition, we'll 
11 find a way to get it done." Mr. Archuletta, Mark Archuletta 
12 and Amos, were track foreman at Thistle. Their depositions 
13 were taken in the Utah Railway case. The Utah Railway and 
14 Denver & Rio Grande attorneys, for instance, they know who 
15 they are, they know that they are important people in that 
16 case. Mr. Amos Archuletta was track foreman on a piece of 
17 track. He has much intimate knowledge about the previous 
18 problem, about the, previous knowledge of the slope and the 
19 mass and the slide. All have important pieces of testimony, 
20 factual testimony. Mr. Mark Archuletta was the foreman in 
21 that piece of track prior to that. 
22 THE COURT: When did you find out about 
23 him? 
24 J MR. YOUNG: I found out about Mark 
Archuletta and Amos Archuletta either when I got the deposi-25 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 tion; I found out about Amos Archuletta when I got the depo-
2 sition up at Salt Lake City at Wendy --
3 THE COURT: When did you do that? 
4 MR. YOUNG: On the 15th of July, 20th of 
5 July. He agreed to testify, Saturday before last, he agreed 
6 to come to court. The first day I ever talked to him, your 
7 Honor, on about the 17th or 18th of July, in mid-July, we 
8 went to the slide area and he said, "boy, Allan, I really 
9 don't want to get involved." The record should reflect I 
10 know Mr. Archuletta; I have never spoken to him about this 
11 matter; I didn't even know he was a D&RG official. His son 
12 I used to coach on a little league baseball team. And I know 
13 Mr. Archuletta. Mr. Archuletta advises me that Mr. Mark 
14 Archuletta would certainly have some facts, because he was 
15 the road foreman prior to Mr. Amos Archuletta. So they both 
16 -- I've talked to them both over the last two weeks. 
17 I advised Mr. Olson a week ago that I was going to 
18 have some additional witnesses. And he said, "I'm going to 
19 Canada." And our agreement was I'd tell him by the 1st. He 
20 wasn't in all last week. And I told him, by the 1st. That's 
21 the two Archulettas. 
22 Mr. Vincent, your Honor, is a man I became aware of 
23 in about mid-July as well. He was the UDOT road foreman in 
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1 some facts about his knowledge in this matter. I first met 
2 him in mid-July. His name came to me from Mr. Anderson, who 
3 was the UDOT District 6 representative, whofs the gentleman 
4 I've always listed as a potential witness, as a may-call. 
5 That's three. 
6 Mr. Shroder, I want to talk about. Oh. Mr. Hinsie, 
7 Your Honor, Mr. Hinsie is a BYU professor, has written plats, 
8 has drawn plats about the Thistle area, was listed as a 
9 potential witness. By the way, your Honor, Mr. Archuletta, 
10 Mr. Amos Archuletta was one of those potential witnesses who 
11 would be called or might be called in the Utah Railway-Denver 
12 & Rio Grande litigation, and his deposition was taken in that 
13 matter. Mr. Mark Archuletta was not listed, although his, 
14 although he was listed as one of the track people in that 
15 litigation. Mr. Vincent I think is really the only fellow 
16 whose name hasn't appeared somewhere along the way in this 
17 litigation to begin with. 
18 I first, I started again when he got, when Mr. 
19 Olson was in town for his deposition on the 18th or 19th of 
20 July, about ten days ago. We went over, again, all of the 
21 pre-reports on the Thistle slide, and found several of them. 
22 One by a Mr. Rigby, one by a Mr. Hinsie, one by a Mr. 
23 Slosson, and one by a Dr. Shroder. I immediately started 
24 calling them. I was turning up all final rocks to see if 
o* +.u„„ U*A awr had anv conversations with the railroad, if j Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 they had ever had any knowledge of what the railroad activi-
2 ties were, if the railroad had ever contacted them. All 
3 three of the main guys I tried to find: Mr. Rigby, Mr. 
4 Hinsie were in Washington D.C., and Mr. Shroder was in Wyoming 
5 walking over the Teton Dam disaster because of slide problems.) 
6 Mr. Shroder, particularly, wrote an article in, he 
7 wrote his doctoral thesis on The Slides of Utah, and parti-
8 cularly, items out of the Thistle slide, in his doctoral 
9 thesis; has photographs of it, has photographs of the rail-
10 road taking dirt from the toe of the slide, has, knew of it. 
11 I finally contacted Mr. Shroder last friday. 
12 THE COURT: When did you find out about 
13 him, from whom? 
14 MR. YOUNG: About Dr. Shroder? 
15 THE COURT: Yes. 
16 MR. YOUNG: Dr. Olson and I were reading 
17 over Dr. Slosson's report. Dr. Slossonfs report, which is a 
18 report that I have had in my possession for many, many months,] 
19 lists about five people that have written about the Thistle 
20 slide, including Dr. Hinsie, Dr. Rigby, Mr. Olsen and Dr. 
21 Shroder. 
22 When I was with Mr. Olson on July the 19th or 20th, 
23 J I agreed that I'd attempt to locate all of those men and talk 
to all of those men about the Thistle slide, because they had 
-:*.,._ ^n„f. t-h* Qlide mass and diagrammed it and platted it 
24 
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1 prior to 1983, some of them as early as 1950. 
2 I finally was able to contact Mr, Shroder. I donft 
3 want to represent everything he might say, because at this 
4 point in time I've provided him a significant amount of 
5 material, and he made some preliminary conclusions to me over 
6 the phone, which I would deem to be work product, but which 
7 are very beneficial to my clients and very helpful to my 
8 case. And if his conclusions are reinforced by the, by the 
9 depositions and things I've now sent him, then I would 
10 definitely want to call him as a witness. He's an expert. 
11 He's the guy that wrote for the Utah Geological Survey the 
12 History of Utah Slides. He's located in Omaha, Nebraska. 
13 Now, I've told Mr. Olson on the phone, when I 
14 advised him of Dr. Shroder, if he wants to take his deposi-
15 tion, we'll find a way to get it taken between now and the 
16 14th. But I'll advise iim what Dr. Shroderfs testimony 
17 generally will be with regard to the issues in this case. 
18 Dr. Hinsie, your Honor, I merely list as a fact 
19 witness. Dr. Hinsie platted the Thistle slide many years 
20 ago. He has taken students on trips, and would take them, 
21 before the slide, and show them the Thistle slide and tell 
22 them that "that's an active slide mass;" all of which is 
23 relevant to this case; all of which is just factual. I'm 
24 not going to ask him for any opinions about the conduct of 
<-Vio railroad nor conduct of anyone else, but merely to lay OK Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 foundation for his studies and his opinions of those things. 
2 I don't think I have ambushed, I don't think I 
3 ambushed them, I think they ambushed me. They said we agreed 
4 that we exchange our witness lists. He knew he was going to 
5 list some more people. He said, "do it by August 1st." I 
6 did it by August 1st. And I don't think I've surprised him 
7 at all. These are people that he could have had contact with 
8 as well. And I don't think he's interferred with, with at 
9 all. The Archulettas are fact witnesses. if he wants to 
10 take their depositions, they are going to talk about the fact^ 
11 and the problems they had at Thistle, and what they did, what 
12 they observed with their eyes, and what they saw. Mr. Hinsie 
13 is going to testify to the same thing, what his observations 
14 of the road was, and what his observations of the slide was. 
15 Those three are just fact witnesses. Hinsie's going to 
16 testify, Dr. Hinsie, will testify to taking his students up 
17 there and showing them an active slide mass that was well 
18 known and well documented. 
19 One of the issues in this case was whether the 
20 railroad knew about it. And became more obvious today, from 
21 the deposition of Mr. Beckwith that I'm right in the middle 
22 of, that that's going to be an issue in this case; whether 
23 I it was active or old; whether the railroad knew or should 
have known about it. And so Dr. Hinsie's testimony becomes 
i .•—^^+.#3^+. ^^ ma ^t f-j^ g stage. 
24 
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10 
1 Your Honor, with regard to the deposition, I have 
2 told Mr. Olson, Mr. Olson holds me to everything in the case, 
3 and so if I, I have, really, four depositions that I really 
4 intend to use, and the other 30 I don't, if I don't tell him 
5 about them, then he's going to stand up and scream to high 
6 heaven when we try this case that I didn't tell him I might 
7 want to use this deposition or that deposition. So out of 
8 an abundance of caution I said because first of all I haven't 
9 J totally read them all yet, secondly, there may be just a para-[ 
graph or two which establishes the authenticity of a document] 
11 | that I may along the way want to introduce, if there is a 
12 I dispute about it, if he denies it exists or something like 
13 I that. And so I don't know as we stand here which depositions 
I was to read. I can report as an officer of the court that 
I think it's horrible practice to read any deposition. I 
think the jury gets bored. I don't think that they like it 
But there are some parts of some depositions that I think 
important. I'll give you an example. And I think it's, and 
I'm, just to show what I'm talking about, I think there's a 
Holtmanwhowas a president or something of the company who, on 
deposition, was asked "Did you know there was a problem at 
thistle?" And he said "We knew there was a problem at Thistl^ 
there for years, we've got to do something about it some day.'f 
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1 And there, the reason I listed Mr. Burroughs, 
2 your Honor, and Mr. Waring, I think those are the other two 
3 witnesses I've potentially listed, is I have no control over 
4 them in court. They are not going to come to Utah for me. 
5 And so Ifm telling Mr. Olson that those two are once Ifm 
6 inclined to read. I will be happy to try; and I asked Patty 
7 to help me with a list right now, and I told Mr. Olson on 
8 the phone yesterday; I'll be happy to try to tell you 
9 basically which ones I intend to read. Part of that, your 
10 Honor is a problem I have with Mr. Olson. Mr. Olson advised 
11 me, for instance, yesterday that Mr. Hilts is now reduced to 
12 a fact witness; although he was the expert geotechnical 
13 engineer that was supposed to be the all-knower in this case, 
14 now reduced to a fact witness in this case. And therefore I 
15 may have to read his deposition. I don't want to, but it 
16 may be required that I have to. There's a Mr. Waring, a Mr. 
17 Burroughs --
18 THE COURT: On what theory do you think 
19 those are admissible? 
20 MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, I studied the 
21 rules a little bit yesterday, and I'll certainly make a 
22 record and supplement it with case law. But the record, the 
23 J rule of law clearly is that if a man is an officer of a 
corporation, it's a defendant and a corporate defendant, and 
'"~—
 4
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1 sp they have, like Mr. Olson has just reported to you where 
2 they have a right to cross examine and ask questions; then 
3 they are admissible for any purpose in a trial of, in any 
4 trial. And this trial deals with the same issues. And the 
5 questions that I would read and talk about in those cases 
6 deal with the same issues: What did you know about Thistle? 
7 And: When did you know it? What problem did you have with 
8 Thistle? What pre-knowledge do you have of hiring geotechni-
9 cal engineers? What pre-knowledge did you have of the rail-
10 road? Those sorts of things that are relevant to the negli-
11 gence in this case. 
12 I intend to read, if they don't make them avail-
13 able, and they tell me they are not going to make them 
14 available. So the only way I can get them in is read them. 
15 And I think that the law is very clear that I have a right to 
16 do that. They were represented, they are officers of the 
17 corporation, and I have the right to read those depositions. 
18 Your Honor --
19 THE COURT: Well, counsel, I'm looking 
20 back; I made an order, directed from the bench, that within 
21 ten days of the 27th of June, that you would prepare and file 
22 with the Court a pre-trial order. That, apparently, has not 
23 been done, for whatever reason. In that pre-trial order it 
24 would have been expected that you list your witnesses that 
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1 the testimony or bring out any witnesses that were not desig-
2 nated or known by the July the 11th, 1989, And that would 
3 include, particularly, it seems to me, Hinsie, Rigby and 
4 Shroder, you've known about them, had access to them for a 
5 long time, Mr, Young, And now to bring them, if you are going) 
6 to designate them at this point as your experts, and in an 
7 objection to it, I'm going to sustain an objection. 
8 As far as the depositions are concerned, I'm not 
9 satisfied, Mr. Olson, that you were responsive to the dis-
10 covery that was submitted. I think in the answer and the 
11 explanation that you've given is that there was no, and the 
12 request was, has been accused of causing or exacerbating the 
13 Thistle slide, the answer is: no, that really the only thing 
14 that was discovered, alleged in that proof, that it might have) 
15 been prevented; I don't think that's a good faith response 
16 to that interrogatory. Seems to me that could have been 
17 answered with candor and could have been indicated a long time] 
18 ago. So that I don't believe that you can claim any surprise 
19 by way of whatever may be discoverable or may be evident as 
20 a consequence of that proceeding. I don't think your answer 
21 is legitimate. I don't think it was appropriate. 
22 But I'm not interested in having you read 73 depo-
23 sitions, sit here and listen to that. 
24 MR. YOUNG: Neither am I. 
rpuv
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1 within five days, who it is you are going to call, and what 
2 of those you are going to try to get in or what you are going 
3 to try to put in, Mr. Young. You've only had these since --
4 or thereabouts. 
5 MR. YOUNG: I think itfs much later than 
6 that, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: But if we are going to have tc| 
8 sit here and listen to 73 depositions and 10,000 pages, we'll 
9 never get through with this lawsuit. But for that reason, 
10 I'm not convinced that this could not have been handled a 
11 long time ago, and I do believe that your position was some-
12 what put off track by the response that was given to that 
13 interrogatory. But as far as these other withesses are 
14 concerned, Shroder, Hinsie and Rigby, those people that were 
15 in these other reports, known about for a long time, Mr. 
16 Young; there is no reason why you couldn't have determined 
17 a long time ago that you were going to need to call these 
18 people. So that as far as those are concerned, Shroder, 
19 Vincent, Hinsie, I'm going to sustain the motion and not 
20 permit you to use those witnesses, because of an untimely 
21 designation of them. 
22 It appears to the Court that if Archuletta was 
23 involved in this prior lawsuit, that they may be something or 
24 who was known to the defendant and ought to have been antici-
oc „+.^.
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1 it, all of this wouldnot have come about. 
2 But today is, today is the 3rd. I want you to 
3 designate what portions of these depositions you expect to 
4 introduce or want to try to introduce. I'm not saying they 
5 are receivable, whether or not they may satisfy the rules of 
6 evidence. So if that turns out to be objected to, we'll have 
7 to rule on that issue. But I think they are entitled to know 
8 what of those you may have, purport to introduce in your case 
9 in chief. I'm not sure that you can be precluded from using 
10 them to impeach or for some such purpose, if there is a dis-
11 pute in the testimony. But as far as his case in chief is 
12 concerned. 
13 Now, today is the 3rd. I want you to have in their 
14 hands, not in the mail, in their hands, by the 9th, Mr. 
15 Young, a designation of which of these depositions and what 
16 portions thereof you expect to offer or propose to use in 
17 your case in chief. I don't know how else to handle it. 
18 MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, I don't want to 
19 argue with you, but --
20 THE COURT: Well, you can argue, you have 
21 that right. 
22 MR. YOUNG: Thank you very much. Your 
23 Honor, so that therefore I can call Mr. Archuletta? 
24 THE COURT: Well, if he was one of those 
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1 MR. YOUNG: He was, and his deposition 
2 was taken. 
3 THE COURT: I don't see why you ought to 
4 be foreclosed from doing that. 
5 Now, you can have your little say, Mr. Richman. 
6 You are looking at me like what have I done. 
7 MR. RICHMAN: Judge, I never have any 
8 problems with the court. I would just like to speak on it. 
9 And I did not seek to defend or intend to defend the answer 
10 in the interrogatories. But I recall in February Mr. Young 
11 saying that he had gone to Denver, he had known all about the 
12 lawsuit, he had the list of all of the witnesses. So even if, 
13 your Honor, we misled in the interrogatory answer back in 
14 November, in February Mr. Young knew about these people. I 
15 think the most revealing thing that we've heard this morning 
16 is that Mr. Young, when he sought a continuance and couldn't 
17 get it, realized he had to do some work in this case. But 
18 that's only occurred within the last two weeks your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Well, be that as it may, I 
20 think you men or your clients knew about this prior lawsuit. 
21 I don't think your response, technically, I suppose you can 
22 say, if in fact the premise of that lawsuit was that it only, 
23 that the negligence alleged was, that it was preventable, 
24 that that really isn't responsive to that question. And your,! 
i — —+. +„
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1 right questions. But I think in all good faith that that 
2 could have been responded to. I can come to no other con-
3 elusion. 
4 MR. RICHMAN: Thank you, your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: So to that extent, I don't 
6 think that the railroad can claim that they haven't know about) 
7 it. And if Mr. Young had the names, I can see you had some 
8 problem in trying to get access to these files, maybe you 
9 asked about Mr. Olson, specifically, "help me to get them." 
10 MR. YOUNG: I did. 
11 THE COURT: You did ultimately, and he 
12 said, before the Court, the last time we were here, how as 
13 can they get. So as I say, it should have been taken care of 
14 a long time ago. But these other witnesses, Mr. Young, I 
15 can see no reason why you can come in at a late day and say 
16 "I decided to use them" because they have not been shown to 
17 you. Mr. Shroder, if he was writing papers and his name was 
18 referred to in other papers, that you've obviously had access 
19 to, — 
20 I MR. YOUNG: I have. 
THE COURT: There's the time when you 
should have started digging. 
MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, what you have 
24 indicated is true. His name has been available in other 
~"~ —
J
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1 no question about that. 
2 I need to make a record in the strongest way, 
3 particularly with Mr. Shroder. Dr. Shroder, that my not 
4 being able to use him and his expertise and his testimony 
5 about what the railroad knew or should have known and what 
6 they did or didn't do, is critical to my lawsuit. It's 
7 just as critical as Dr. Olsen's and Dr. Leonard's testimony. 
8 And I think I'm horribly prejudiced. These people have the 
9 opportunity to depose him. I'll make him available. I don't 
10 honestly know the bottom line of all of his testimony. Mr. 
11 Beckwith's been referring to his reports very favorably to 
12 their side all day long. 
13 THE COURT: Well, you have your record, 
14 Mr. Young. I understand your position. And I'm telling you, 
15 in my view, it's too late. And that even though they give 
16 them an opportunity to depose next week, then they've got to 
17 get experts, they've got to get somebody, if they want to 
18 counter it, so that you don't have a reasonable opportunity 
19 to prepare your case, either side. It seems to me that this 
20 is something that ought to have been done a long time ago. 
21 MR. YOUNG: Very well, your Honor. May 
22 I do this, may we mark some exhibits for purposes of the 
23 record on this matter? I'd like to mark Mr. Olson's letter 
24 to me of July 8th telling me that we agree to file those. 
TWT?
 ™TTPT. You can make your record. 
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1 I want you to have your record. I'm not trying to foreclose 
2 that in any way. But I here have to make a decision. And I 
3 want the case to go to, trial. 
4 MR. YOUNG: So do I, now. 
5 THE COURT: I don't want either side to 
6 be prejudiced. But I don't know if I can pull your irons out 
7 of the fire for something that you should have done a long 
8 time ago, Mr. Young. And for that reason, I would, other-
9 wise, I would not a thing, not even let you talk about these 
10 depositions. But I do see some legitimate reason to permit 
11 you to go into those. But I do think they are entitled to 
12 know what it is that you may want to try to introduce on your 
13 case in chief. I'm not foreclosing the possibility of using 
14 them, if they are available, for that purpose or by way of 
15 impeachment. 
16 MR. YOUNG: Your Honor --
17 THE COURT: Rebuttal. That maybe you 
18 don't have to designate things for that. 
19 MR. YOUNG: I assume therefore that the 
20 rule is the same for Mr. Olson and that anybody that he hasn't| 
21 listed by July the 14th wouldn't be allowed to testify, as 
22 well? 
23 THE COURT: T h a t ' s my r u l i n g . 
24 MR. YOUNG: Thank you. 
TWTr
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1 of, let me know, and put them in --
2 MR. YOUNG: May I mark the July 12th 
3 letter as Exhibit 1 to this hearing, your Honor. 
4 Also, I'd call the Court's attention to the pre-
5 vious pre-trial orders which indicate that any other addi-
6 tional witness will be listed ten days before trial. That 
7 was the Court's previous pre-trial order. 
8 MR. OLSON: There's never been a pre-
9 trial order. 
10 MR. YOUNG: Well, that was the one you 
11 proposed. 
12 MR. OLSON: But the Court's never signed 
13 a pre-trial order. 
14 THE COURT: I've never signed any such 
15 order, Mr. Young. 
16 MR. YOUNG: Okay. May the record show 
17 that the one that Mr. Olson proposed to me in the letter 
18 dated June 2, 1989 indicated that in the event other witnes-
19 ses are to be called at trial, statement and -- general sub-
20 ject matter of this testimony will be served upon opposing 
21 counsel, filed with the Court at least ten days prior to 
22 trial? 
23 THE COURT: That may very well be. But 
24 I'm not aware that I signed any such order. And apparently 
f- „ 4.^  ,• +. ^y. Ttfhpi-ever vou received was not 
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accepted by you. So I don't want to foreclose you from 
making your record, each of you. You are entitled to do 
that. 
MR. YOUNG: that's my record. And the 
gentleman that I most care about is Mr. Shroder. Mr. Hinsie 
was going to be a fact witness, and I can introduce his 
reports through others. 
Mr. Young, 
got' 
motion to compel? 
THE COURT: I understand your problem, 
MR. YOUNG: Okay. 
THE COURT: You understand my position. 
MR. YOUNG: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. YOUNG: What other matter have we 
MR. YOUNG: May I make a motion on my 
THE COURT: Are you prepared to discuss 
that? What are you fussing about? 
MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, when we took the 
deposition of Mr. Larry Hansen, he, who is an expert on 
their behalf, he apparently is going to testify about the 
results of some analysis he has run on the Thistle slide 
through computers. One of the most important things in terms 
„.e ^^a^ina
 a n-rnqc; examination about that is the reason-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may c ntain errors.
1 ableness of the imput and the reasonableness of the output 
2 and the reports of the output. I asked Mr. Hansen at the 
3 time of his deposition how much of that would, how much paper 
4 that would entail. And he held his hands like that and 
5 said thousands of pages or many, many pages. (indicating) 
6 The next day at the deposition of Dr. Olsen, Dr. 
7 Olsen advised me that the input and the output numbers would 
8 be very limited. And Mr. Hansen was there as well, and 
9 agreed that it wouldn't be a lot of paperwork. I requested 
10 at that time for purposes of cross examination that those 
11 input and output documents of Mr. Hansen's, I made a record 
12 on it in the deposition, be provided to me, or that it would 
13 be my position that Mr. Hansen couldn't testify to his 
14 opinion in this case, because I have no opportunity to cross 
15 examine and prepare a cross examination. 
16 I have since talked to Mr. Olson about it, Monday 
17 and yesterday. I faxed him a letter last night about it, and 
18 I faxed him a motion to compel about it, and request again 
19 those documents, and request that they be made available to 
20 me immediately, so that my experts can study them, or that 
21 Mr. Hansen not be allowed to testify in this case about the 
22 results of those documents. Was because we have no way of 
23 cross examining him. The defendants submit that, your Honor, 
24 that these take days and days to run and that they create 
OK I t-Vi^Mic? a - n r l o r\ "F n u f f o o -f -n ^ n n n f f l f i n f c i n hai-VTaem "Rut* T H o n f t hflVP 
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1 the money to do all of that. But my people have, say -- we 
2 can see the input and output, we can kind of come to conclu-
3 sion whether everything in between is reasonable. And Mr. 
4 Richman has told me he would not give me. And I would move 
5 that he be required to give them to me. 
6 One other thing, your Honor. This is to bring to 
7 the Court's attention, so it's on the record. I asked to 
8 see the photographs of Mr. Ozment. And I have requested a 
9 deposition, notice of deposition of Mr. Hilts. The purpose 
10 of the deposition of Hilts is that in his deposition he told, 
11 excuse me, in a, in a curriculum vitae that I was provided, 
12 he was, he himself has done some reports, among other things, 
13 on slope stability for railroads, for the Northern Pacific 
14 Railroad. I noticed the deposition of Mr. Hilts for next 
15 Monday, to have that record available. It was just a docu-
16 ments session so that I could see that report and a couple 
17 of other records that he's done. 
18 Mr. Olson advised me on these two matters. No. 1, 
19 on the photographs, they don't intend to use any of Ozment's 
20 photographs, and therefore they are not going to bring them 
21 and they are not going to make them available to see. And, 
22 no. 2, all I asked them to do is bring them all to trial, or 
23 "bring your Thistle photographs to trial, Mr. Ozment." He 
24 tells me he wouln't do that. No. 2, he tell me that he's Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 fact only, he's not an expert witness; and, that he will not 
2 be there Monday. And I want to advise the Court of that; 
3 that I think that I'll be prejudiced by that, if I'm not 
4 entitled to see Mr. Hilts' writings on slope stability and 
5 railroads and things like that which I think are extremely 
6 relevant to this case. 
7 THE COURT: Mr. Richman? 
8 MR. RICHMAN: Yes. We might bifurcate 
9 this, your Honor, with respect to these things that I've 
10 declined. Mr. Young as per usualhas got it a little bit 
11 wrong. What he really has asked to see is what's called the 
12 "limited equilibrium analysis," that's run on the computer 
13 J program. The Court may or may not recall, Blaine Leonard 
did what was called a "finite limit analysis." One of the 
15 I ways we have of checking the validity of the finite limit 
16 I analysis is to run what's generally thought of as generally 
accepted scientific tests in the geophysical world, and that 
is running a limited equilibrum analysis, and which in nature 
has been run by Mr. Hansen and his office on their computer 
program. 
Now, generally, I would have no difficulty whatso-
ever, turning that analysis over. This one, by the way, is 
up to here. (indicating) That would be the point. The 
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1 think wefve pretty much persuaded or satisfied Mr. Young that 
2 the finite element analysis is --
3 MR. YOUNG: Please don't represent what 
4 you've convinced me of, Mr. Richman. 
5 MR. RICHMAN: I kept quiet, Mr. Young, 
6 for change while you were talking. I really did. 
7 THE COURT: Let me hear you. 
8 MR. RICHMAN: Okay. What we wanted to 
9 do is, the tests, finite element analysis with the limited 
10 equilibrium, and be able to see if we get the same answers 
11 with respect to the factor of safety. And we did that, and 
12 we got totally different answers. Which to our mind con-
13 vinces us that the finite element analysis is no good. Their 
14 expert, Dr. Olsen, testified in deposition the other day. 
15 I might state that when this deposition was taken, about a 
16 year ago, he said he was going to do a limited equilibrium 
17 analysis on this slide so that he could verify the work, 
18 the finite element analysis. We took his deposition again 
19 basically for the purpose of finding out what he did in terms 
20 of his limited equilibrium analysis. And what we got is a 
21 scenario that Mr. Young doesn't have any money so hasn't paid 
22 or hasn't authorized for the payment of Dr. Olsen to do it, 
23 but Dr. Olsen may do a limited equilibrium analysis, he just 
24 doesn't know yet. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 analysis, and we do have some back up papers that are 
2 certainly available and, under normal circumstances, judge, 
3 I would give. However, we got Dr. Olson and Mr. Young 
4 saying they don't know if they are even going to do one; 
5 and if they do one pursuant to an agreement with me, they 
6 said theyfd give it to us two to three days before trial; 
7 but they can't even tell us whether, if they are going to 
8 do one. And it seems to me itfs patently unfair that we 
9 should have to turn over our work product with respect to a 
10 limited equilibrium analysis and then have Dr. Olsen go out 
11 and do one under those circumstances. I mean, we are put 
12 in a terrible bind, being able to have Dr. Olsen shoot at our 
13 work, and we've no possibleway of shtting at something Dr. 
14 Olsen may or may not do. I just thought it was patently 
15 unfair, the position that they were taking. Especially when 
16 we brought Dr. Olson back just for the purpose of telling us 
17 what his limited equilibrium analysis was going to be as 
18 important and he hadn't even done it yet. So I felt kind 
19 of put out by it. 
20 And I just think what I would be more than willing 
21 to do is, if they tell me they are not going to do a limited 
22 equilibrium analysis, I'm more than happy to turn it over to 
23 them. If they tell me they are going to do a limited equi-
24 librium analysis, I'm willing to -- them at the same time I 
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1 But I don't think that we should be turning our stuff over 
2 to them without having some assurance from that that they 
3 are either going to do it or not going to do it. And thatfs 
4 the problem I had with it, your Honor. 
5 I would defer to Mr. Olson on some of these other 
6 things. 
7 MR. OLSON: Real quickly, your Honor, 
8 on Hilts and Ozment. 
9 On David Hilts, David Hilts is the geotechnical 
10 engineer who advised, he was on the slide when the slide 
11 happened, he is a fact witness, he knows the facts in that 
12 case. We have never called him as an expert. We have never 
13 told Mr. Young we were going to. In fact have made clear to 
14 Mr. Kester of Mr. Youngfs office that he was not going to be 
15 an expert in this case. 
16 We are calling him to tell the jury, we'll call him 
17 to tell the jury what he saw down there at the slide. He's 
18 not -- he lives in Oregon. Mr. Young was aware of those 
19 facts, or should have been aware of those facts, had he 
20 reviewed the file, and I simply have -- problem. But if Mr. 
21 Young, had he noticed the deposition, there is no way this, 
22 the court, in process or reaching that individual and the 
23 procedures to obtain a subpoena, which can be obtained from 
24 the courts of Oregon, which can be from any sister state and 
25 I subpoena it. And at this Doint in timp. all T-JP'T-^  Hm'na 
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1 that simply isnft something that we can do. And I don't 
2 think it's something we've tried to do, Mr. Hilts not being 
3 employed by the railroad and not being our expert. 
4 With respect to Mr. Ozment's photos. It's been 
5 a matter of discussion for sometime, and I think it was 
6 August 31st, just this Monday, I had indicated to Mr. Young 
7 with some anticipation that I would be in Denver, Colorado 
8 and that he was welcome to go to Denver and view Mr. Ozment's 
9 photos and make determination as to what, if any, of those he 
10 would like to have. They are Mr. Ozment's photos. He keeps 
11 them in his possession. He's got hundreds of thousands of 
12 photos, all over the railroad. It is a hobby of his. And 
13 among those photos are some photos of the Thistle area, some 
14 of them appeared along the Thistle slide, which is why, I'm 
15 sure, Mr. Young is interested. But at present Mr. Ozment 
16 has just gone through a divorce, and he boxed all of those 
17 up and put them in storage. But after some persuasion, he's 
18 agreed, because we didn't want to make things difficult for 
19 Mr. Young, instead of having to subpoena it, I agreed with 
20 J Mr. Young that he could go to Denver on the 31st of August 
and at that time he could look at any of those photos, and 
he could choose and make copies of them and he could present 
them at trial. And I said, "Mr. Young, I'm going to be out 
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1 I returned to my office last Wednesday and called 
2 and asked if Mr. Young made any call. There is nothing, no 
3 indication he was going to go to Denver. He left it up in th^ 
4 air. The last time I had seen him, the Friday before my 
5 scheduled trip to Denver. And Allen's never suggested to me 
6 that he intended to make that trip --in fact at the most and 
7 said "Mr. Ozment, bring all of your Thistle photos over here.1 
8 That's what discovery is for. 
9 The central fact is that Mr. Young should have gone 
10 over and looked at the photos, with the opportunity that he 
11 had. He's now asking Mr. Ozment to make some sort of judg-
12 ment which he'll probably call into question when he does. 
13 MR. YOUNG: I'll withdraw the request to 
14 have Mr. Ozment bring the photos. I'll just talk about it 
15 with him when he's a witness. 
16 THE COURT: Well, that takes care of it. 
17 MR. OLSON: And on Mr. Hinsie, would 
18 that depositions of, depositions could bind non-parties, 
19 but they don't. And inasmuch as if he's a non-party, and Mr. 
20 Young can't contend otherwise, and inasmuch as we have never 
21 help him out to be an expert in that case, he is and always 
22 has been a fact witness. He was deposed in 1986 when this 
23 case was first filed, and three years have gone by, and now 
24 we hear about the need to depose him again. And I say, fine, 
25 I that he can subnoena him. All I can sav is. that- hp shouldn't! 
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1 be entitled to simply notice his deposition on the railroad. 
2 And, you know, we may or may not be able to get Mr. Hilts 
3 available. I can't even tell you what would happen. And 
4 I'm not sure that what he's asking for is all that important, 
5 anyway. 
6 THE COURT: Well, I guess that's for Mr. 
7 Young to decide. 
8 MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, may I just speak 
9 to that? 
10 THE COURT: Yes. 
11 MR. YOUNG: Well, both of those issues, 
12 I withdraw my request for Mr. Ozment's photos. 
13 With regard to Mr. Hilts, your Honor, and I don't 
14 have the record here, but I noticed Mr. Hilts before for a 
15 deposition, and I think that notice went to the railroad, and 
16 I think they provided him to me in 1986 or 1987, and he was 
17 their expert at that time, and he was provided by them. I 
18 didn't serve them in Oregon or anything else. He was their 
19 retained expert and on Thistle. They brought him down here. 
20 They looked at the side. He was the guy who was making the 
21 decision. 
22 THE COURT: If they are not going to call 
23 him as an expert witness, then I'll hold them to it. But 
24 J just a fact witness then you can subpoena under the rules the 
—~~~.~ ,P,„,T T ^^ T-I
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1 that. 
2 MR. YOUNG: Okay. 
3 THE COURT: But the record should show 
4 that they designated that he is not an expert, and is a fact 
5 witness, and at the time of trial his testimony as an expert, 
6 be it proffered, will not be received. 
7 So, what's the other one? 
8 MR. YOUNG: The other one was the finite 
9 element analysis, of the equilibrium analysis, that we had 
10 requested of the defendants. 
11 THE COURT: Seems to me on that, Mr. 
12 Young, that Mr. Richman's proposal is a reasonable one. If 
13 you are not going to have Mr. Olson testify or prepare one, 
14 then he'll give it to you. If he is going to prepare one, 
15 then you give them, you exchange his with theirfs. 
16 MR. YOUNG: May I speak to that? 
17 THE COURT: Yes. 
18 MR. YOUNG: I didn't know that the money 
19 issue became quite as open at the deposition as all that. 
20 But it, Mr. Olson's desire is to see theirs, and if he agrees 
21 with it, there would be no reason for him to do one. If he 
22 doesn't agree with it, then I would have to pay him a lot of 
23 money to do one. I don't have a lot of money. My clients 
24 don't have a lot of money. If Mr. Olson believes that there 
j„ — ^ ^ o e ^ a K i v WP don't intend to do one; that is, all Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 we intend is to look at theirs, and if we think the equili-
2 brium analysis they've done is reasonable, we are not going 
3 to do one. On ther other hand, and their1s has been prepared\ 
4 I haven't gone to the expense of having him do that, if he 
5 believes that there's something strange about their report, 
6 then he would like to do one. But he won't know until he 
7 sees theirs. 
8 THE COURT: But the problem with it, Mr. 
9 Your, is you are up to the time before trial, then if he make^ 
10 one, then they've got to have time to look at it. I think 
11 that this is something, again, that should have been addressee^ 
12 a long time ago. And my feeling on that matter is that if 
13 you designate and say that you are not going to have Mr. 
14 Olson present such an analysis, then I'll give you a copy of 
15 theirs. But if he does propose to do that, then you exchange 
16 them. 
17 MR. YOUNG: Okay, your Honor. May we 
18 have a date certain upon which they'll, within 24 hours of 
19 the time I advise them? Mr. Olson told me their Mr. Hansen 
20 was in town yesterday or today, and it must be here, so if 
21 I advise them like today, this afternoon, after talking to 
22 Dr. Olsen, can I get it tomorrow? 
23 MR. RICHMAN: Yes, I would think I could 
24 certainly have it within 48 hours, once I'm told their Mr. 
n1 4
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1 have it, clearly within 48 hours, and hand-deliver it to 
2 Mr. Young. 
3 THE COURT: Yes. That's will be part of 
4 the Order. 
5 Have you been writing all of this down, Mr. Olson? 
6 I'm going to have you make an order, get something in writing 
7 so that we can all refer to it. 
8 MR. OLSON: I'll try my best, your Honor 
9 THE COURT: What else have we got? 
10 MR. OLSON: One thing that would be 
11 helpful, your Honor, that was brought to our attention 
12 yesterday, in talking to our expert: We would like to have 
13 our expert present and Mr. Hansen when Mr. Young's experts 
14 testify at trial. Mr. Hansen brought to our attention that 
15 he is under something of a work crunch because of some pending 
16 disasters up in British Columbia. It would be helpful if Mr. 
17 Young could indicate when he would intend to call Mr. Olsen 
18 -- and Mr. Hansen, so we could bring --it would not 
19 otherwise be necessary to attend the rest of the trial, 
20 except for his own testimony. But we would want him here for 
21 Mr. Leonard and Mr. Olsen. So that will be helpful to us. 
22 MR. YOUNG: I will try to accommodate 
23 that, your Honor. I don't believe in trying cases in the 
24 dark. Mr. Olson has represented to me that Mr. Ozment will 
" - ^ ~ -
1
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1 THE COURT: And then I understand that 
2 you will notify them? When will you know that you are going 
3 to anticipate calling Mr. is it Mr. Olsen? 
4 MR. YOUNG: Dr. Olsen, your Honor, and 
5 Mr. Leonard. I believe, I111 tell the Court right now, I 
6 believe I have Mr. Leonard scheduled Tuesday and Wednesday, 
7 and Dr. Olsen Thursday and Friday. I had anticipated hope-
8 fully that Mr. Shroder would be called Thursday, Dr. Olsen 
9 would be called Friday. Mr. Shroder can't testify. Then 
10 Dr. Olsen will probably testify Thursday, if the course of th4 
11 trial is going such that we are ready for him. And I intend 
12 to call Mr. Leonard Tuesday or Wednesday. The first week 
13 and the first couple of days. 
14 MR. RICHMAN: Appreciate that, Mr. Young 
15 Just in terms of some time on this, your Honor, 
16 we have and we are putting together right now a number of 
17 motions in limine on evidentiary matters. We would like to 
18 get them filed and scheduled to be heard, so that Mr. Young 
19 has some time to respond to them, be heard the morning of 
20 trial, before we pick the jury. Would that be an acceptable 
21 mechanism for the Court? 
22 THE COURT: Well, my scheduling order 
23 is proposed to avoid all of these last minute motions. What 
24 are you talking about? 
OK
 ' MR. RICHMAN: Well, one of them is 
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1 reference to insurance. 
2 One of them is reference to the Utah Railway law-
3 suit and the outcome of the Utah Railway lawsuit. We have no 
4 objection to when he reads the deposition from the Utah 
5 Railway case, that on such and such a day this deposition 
6 was taken in the following phase. But in terms of talking 
7 about what the Utah Railway case was about or the outcome of 
8 the Utah Railway case, I think that is irrelevant to this 
9 particular case, because it's far more an issue in that 
10 case than simply one of a counterclaim. 
11 There were a bunch of others. 
12 MR. OLSON: There are a number of ques-
13 tions, like state of mind, evidence of state of mind. I woul4 
14 have to go back and look. 
15 Mr. Young has indicated he wants to read the 
16 D&RGW1s 1983 corporate reports and indicates the tax benefits 
17 were taken because of this, this disaster. Well, we would 
18 object to that as being irrelevant and prejudicial. And all 
19 of that will be brief. We've got it prepared, and prepared 
20 to file it. We wanted to see his exhibit list first to be 
21 sure we weren't being prejudiced just in requesting the Court 
22 that include that he wasn't an intender. 
23 I MR. RICHMAN: They want all of our 
insurance policies into evidence. And just a brief over-
™-_, T+. o^^mo t-n mo fhp rmpstion in this case is to be 
24 
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1 judged by the objective standard of reasonable man!s standard, 
2 The standard is not what was the railroad thinking when it 
3 took it, this action, or didn't take this action. The only 
4 thing we look at is what actions was taken, what action 
5 wasn't taken, and was that reasonable. Not what's in the 
6 mind of the railroad as to whether or not their business --
7 insurance will pay for any disaster or whether they will get 
8 tax benefits as a result of having the mountain fall down on 
9 them, the top of the Town of Thistle. That's the kind of 
10 thing we don't think should come into evidence. When we got 
11 the exhibit list, we saw this really clear, even though 
12 they didn't reach it as a pleading. 
13 THE COURT: When can you file your 
14 motion? 
15 MR. RICHMAN: We'll have them filed. 
16 THE COURT: All right. Then you can, I 
17 want you to respond to them by next Thursday, Mr. Young, if 
18 you've got anything you want to put in writing in response 
19 to them. 
20 MR. YOUNG: Oh, I'm sure I will. 
21 THE COURT: But in any event then, it 
22 looks to me like there's no point in calling a jury much 
23 before 1:00 o'clock on Monday. And my determination at this 
24 point is that, as far as preemptories are concerned, there 
—* "• "• *-- *-T™^^ ^„
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1 plaintiff have three. We have asked 50 jurors to come. Do 
2 you think that's adequate? 
3 MR. OLSON: I'd say so, your Honor. 
4 MR. YOUNG: With three preempts, your 
5 Honor, I think probably so. 
6 THE COURT: All right, what else? 
7 MR. OLSON: There are really two house-
8 keeping matters that we might make you aware of now. 
9 We are going to make a motion to ask the Court to 
10 permit, under Rule 47(j), I believe it is, of the Rules of 
11 Civil Procedure, permit the jury to visit the site of the 
12 slide at some point during the course of the trial. And I 
13 don't know, Allen's never really indicated to he he has any 
14 objection to that. I don't know. He's fought all the way 
15 through, so I wouldn't represent he's said it's okay. But it 
16 seems to me as though that would be an appropriate thing, 
17 given that's the site of the event, so long at hand. And it's] 
18 just a crucial thing in the jury's domination. 
19 Second item, also sort of housekeeping. We gave 
20 this (indicating) to Allen today. And I know he hasn't had 
21 a chance to review it. We've, we prepared through the color 
22 photo copying process a small book of photographs that we 
23 anticipate being referenced in the course of the trial, and 
24 we have organized them into books that might be submitted to 
OK I „„„u i„rr,ir qn f0 t-hp extent that we want them to look at 
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1 what is done and want to have a look at evidence, and photo-
2 graphic evidence, they could look at those, basically, jury 
3 books, thatfs all we intend to include. And we've given a 
4 copy to Mr. Young today. We would anticipate that this will 
5 help them understand this better. It's an awfully difficult 
6 question, as wefve all learned in taking depositions and 
7 having discussions with people, and we want to make it easy 
8 as possible for the jury. 
9 Both of these steps we think would assist them. 
10 THE COURT: You!d better put in a motion 
11 and let him address it. 
12 MR. YOUNG: Absolutely. On visiting the 
13 site, I havenft decided. I'll talk with Mr. Olson about it. 
14 Let me think about that one. 
15 With regard to the photographs, that may be highly 
16 prejudicial and highly tainted their way. I might note that 
17 Mr. Ozment, who took photographs of the scene for years, 
18 doesn't happen to have any in there. And I'll have huge 
19 objections to that book. 
20 THE COURT: Well, make your motion as 
21 part of your motion, and I'll expect you to be here on the 
22 morning of the 14th. I won't call the jury to come in until 
23 I 1:00 o'clock. 
MR. RICHMAN:. If you don't kick us out 
^ „^„^ w^ nn-r wp'll think of other things to talk about. 
24 
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THE COURT: Well, I want you to have your 
record, men. I would hope we could get it so that it's 
understandable when it goes upstairs. 
MR. OLSON: Fine. I just want to let you 
know we are making those motions. I just thought the Court 
would be interested to know just where we were headed. Thank 
you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I want you to prepare an 
order with respect to what we've done today, Mr. Olson. 
MR. OLSON: I will, your Honor. 
(WHEREUPON, the Court stood in recess at 1:02 
o'clock p.m.) 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
E. Scott Savage 
Michael F. Richman 
Eric C. Olson 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Attorneys for Defendant The Denver and 
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT BERRETT, et al., 
Plaintiffs , 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
INC. 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
PROPOSED WITNESSES AND 
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY 
Civil NO. CV86-616 
Judge Cullen Y. Christensen 
The Defendant The Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Company (the "Railroad"), through counsel, moves the Court to 
strike the names of certain individuals proposed by the 
plaintiffs as witnesses in this action or whose depositions the 
plaintiffs propose to read at trial. As grounds for this 
motion, the Railroad states that, on August 1, 1989, the 
plaintiffs' counsel for the first time advised the Railroad's 
counsel of the identity of five non-party witnesses that may be 
called at trial. In addition, the plaintiffs' counsel 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
identified for the first time the depositions of seventy-three 
people deposed in the Utah Railway litigati on that might be 
read at trial. This belated identification of new witnesses 
and the last minute, ambiguous designation of dozens of 
depositions is a severe imposition on counsel. Only eleven 
days remain until trial. The plaintiffs propose nothing short 
of an ambush and their proposed use of eighty new witnesses 
whether live or by deposition should be rejected. 
DATED this 2A d aY o f August, 1989. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Michael F. Richman 
Eric C. Olson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone (801) 532-3333 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE 
PROPOSED WITNESSES AND DEPOSITION TESTIMONY to be 
hand-delivered this &k\ day of August, 1989, to the following: 
Allen K. Young 
Randy S. Kester 
Young & Kester 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
\^U^ JC^ 
76620(14) 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
E. Scott Savage 
Michael F. Richman 
Eric C. Olson 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Attorneys for Defendant The Denver and 
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT BERRETT, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
INC. 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
PROPOSED WITNESSES AND 
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY 
Civil NO. CV86-616 
Judge Cullen Y. Christensen 
The defendant The Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Company (the "Railroad"), through counsel, submits this 
memorandum in support of the Railroad's Motion to Strike 
Proposed Witnesses and Deposition Testimony. 
ARGUMENT 
1. New Witnesses 
On August 1, 1989, the plaintiffs' counsel advised the 
Railroad's coinsel for the first time that it might call J. F. 
Shroder, L. F. Hintze, Ames Archuleta, Mark Archuleta and Fred 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Vincent as witnesses at trial- For the forty months prior to 
August 1, 1989 that this litigation has been pending, the 
plaintiffs never once made mention of any of these 
individuals. Now, with only twelve days remaining until trial, 
the plaintiffs suddenly drop these new names on the Railroad. 
There is no excuse for this delay. It is now too late to 
conduct meaningful discovery of these witnesses. The delay in 
naming them is entirely the plaintiffs' fault. The plaintiffs 
should be precluded from calling these new witnesses. 
2. Seventy-Three Depositions 
On August 1, 1989, the plaintiffs also provided the 
Railroad with a list of depositions from the Utah Railway 
litigation that the plaintiffs might read at trial. This list 
includes seventy-three names: John Gaskell, Horst Eublacker, 
William Holtman, Ed Waring, Hubert Meek, Orlando Miera, DuWayne 
Gilson, Gale Aydellott, Jack Coppersmith, Charles Colborg, 
Robert Griffin, James Slosson, Thomas Foley, Francis Lewis, 
Arthur Manley, Larry Listello, Melvin Brdar, Stephen Dietz, 
David Hilts, Phyllis Katz, Roland Haacke, Mary Beth Grix, 
Marjorie Giuntini, Raymond Dettore, Donald Davis, Owen Keith 
Curtis, James Ozment, Alan Bell, John Cole, John Ambrosia, 
William Callor, Sr., William Callor, Jr., John Baughman, Amos 
Archuleta, James Bussio, Robert Hatch, Virginia McD^rmott, 
Robert Ourada, Bob Nance, E. Peter Mathies, Raymond Trabulsi, 
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James McBride, Richard Vassallo, Darrell Giles, Richard 
Wiegardt, Arthur Manley, John West II, Delmar Yoakum, Frank 
Stuart, Walter Steckman, Gerard Shuirman, Barry Seaton, James 
Newcomb, Samual Munderar, Donald Miller, Richard Van Horn, 
David J. Varnes, Charles Joseph Burroughs, Michael B. Davis, 
Jimmie Myers, Renee Mottram, Vern Jeffers, Jerry Pearson, Scott 
Carey, Ronald Packard, Colin Rupel, Larry Parsons, James 
Pickard, R. Todd Neilson, Robert Pace, Harold Ross, Steven 
Posner and Victor Posner. 
The plaintiffs make no attempt to delineate which 
depositions or portions of depositions they intend to read. 
The depositions designated include thousands of transcribed 
pages with volumes of exhibits. Such a belated, universal 
designation is entirely improper. At this late date, the 
Railroad is deprived of any meaningful opportunity to prepare 
for this testimony by (a) securing attendance of witnesses, (b) 
deposing designated witnesses or (c) reviewing in advance the 
proposed testimony. The plaintiffs would be poised to use any 
fraction of the voluminous proposed testimony leaving the 
Railroad with no meaningful means of preparation. The 
plaintiffs' designation should be stricken as nothing short of 
ambush. 
3. Scheduling Deadlines 
On October 7, 1988, prior to the February 21, 1989 
trial date, the Court entered a Scheduling Order. (A copy of 
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the Order is attached hereto.) Under the Order, the Court 
required the exchange of witness lists no later than 98 days 
before trial. On May 12, 1989, the Railroad's counsel 
forwarded to the plaintiffs' counsel a proposed Scheduling 
Order containing similar deadlines for the August 14, 1989 
trial date with the exception that the date for exchange of 
witness lists was set at for seventy days before trial. (A 
copy of this proposal and the accompanying letter is attached 
hereto.) The plaintiffs1 counsel refused to stipulate to the 
entry of the proposed Scheduling Order or to commit in writing 
to any deadlines. Thus, no Scheduling Order was ever entered. 
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs were fully aware of the time 
limits deemed appropriate by the Court and those deemed 
necessary by the Railroad. In the face of such deadlines and 
proposals, there is no excuse for their eleventh hour wholesale 
naming of entirely new witnesses. 
DATED thisj?<£V day of August, 1989. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Michael F. Richman 
Er:Le~>C. Olson ^_ 
A^ftorneys for Defendant 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone (801) 532-3333 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE PROPOSED WITNESSES AND DEPOSITION 
TESTIMONY to be hand-delivered this Z^X day of August, 1989, 
to the following: 
Allen K. Young 
Randy S. Kester 
Young & Kester 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Ut^h 84663 
76620(4) 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
ROBERT BERRETT et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 




P l a i n t i f f ( s ) A l l e n K. Young, Esq . 
Case Number: CV-86-616 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
Ranyd Kester, Esq. 
Defendant(s) Eric Olsen 
SETTLEMENT CHANCES: Excellent ; Good ; Fair XXXXX; 
EXPERT WITNESSES TO BE SUBPOENED WITHIN 6_0 DAYS OF DATE. 
DEADLINE FOR AMENDMENTS: Closed 
DISCOVERY COMPLETE DATE: December 23, 1988 
EXCHANGE WITNESS LISTS: November 15, 1988 
MOTION CUT-OFF DATE: January 9, 1989 
PRE-TRIAL ORDER DATE BY: November 15, 1988 
TRIAL BRIEFS BY: February 10, 1989 
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS BY: February 10, 1989 
SPECIAL VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS BY: February 10, 1989 
TRIAL: February 21, 1989 at 9:00 a.m. 
Anticipated Length: 2weeks 
Judge ; Jury XXXXXX ; Setting Firm 
Dated this 7th day of October, 1S88. 
BY THE COURT: 
Cc: to counsel 
CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE 
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May 12, 1989 
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curro«o t_ ASHTON 
JOHH CRAWTORO. J H . 
WILLIAM G . rOWLCft 
GCORGC M. MCMILLAN 
THOMAS L. MONSON 
M«CMACL f. RtCMMAM 
Randy S. Kester, Esq. 
YOUNG 8c KESTER 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, UT 84663 
Re: Berrett v. D&RGW Railroad 
Dear Randy: 
Enclosed is a proposed Scheduling Order for entry by 
Judge Christensen. Please indicate your agreement to the form 
and content of the Order and return it to me for filing. 
Should you have any questions please do not hesitate to call. 
I also look forward to scheduling the completion of 
the depositions of Joseph Olsen and Blaine Leonard. Please 
advise me promptly of their earliest availability. 
Sincerely, 
Eric C. Olson 
EC0:sw 
Enclosure 
cc: Michael F. Richman, Esq. (w/enclosure) 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
E. Scott Savage (#2865) 
Michael F. Richman (#4180) 
Eric C. Olson (#4108) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT BERRETT, GERALD ) 
ARGYLE, et al., ) 
Plaintiffs, ) SCHEDULING ORDER 
vs. ) Civil No. CV-86-616 
DENVER AND RIO GRANDE ) Judge Cullen Y. Christensen 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, ) 
INC., ) 
Defendant. ) 
The parties being in agreement and the Court being 
otherwise sufficiently advised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter proceed as 
follows: 
1. Expert witnesses to be subpoenaed within sixty days 
of the date of this Order. 
2. Deadline for amendments: Closed. 
3. Discovery completion date: June 29, 1989. 
4. Exchange witness lists: June 2, 1989. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5. Motion cut-off date: July 14, 1989. 
6. Pretrial Order by: June 19, 1989. 
7. Trial briefs by: August 4, 1989. 
8. Requested jury instructions by: August 4, 1989. 
9. Special voir dire questions by: August 4, 1989. 
10. Trial: August 14, 1989 at 9:00 a.m. 
11. Anticipated length: Two weeks. 
12. Trial by jury: Firm setting. 
DATED this day of May, 1989. 
Cullen Y. Christensen 
Agreed to: 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
75640 
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C O P Y 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT BERRETT, GERALD 
ARGYLE, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
Case No. CV-86-616 
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING 
OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
INC., 
Defendant. 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that the above-entitled 
matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
Cullen Y. Christensen, Judge of the above-entitled Court, on 
the 3rd day of January, 1990, at the hour of 3:13 o'clock 
p.m., at Room 310, County Courthouse, 51 South University, 
Provo, Utah; 
That there appeared as counsel represen-
ting plaintiffs, ALLEN K. YOUNG, ESQ. and RANDY S. KESTER, 
ESQ., and as counsel representing defendant, MICHAEL F. 
RICHMAN, ESQ. and ERIC C. OLSON, ESQ. 
WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were 
had: 
THE COURT: The matter we have before 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 





1 " | 
1 a world-reputed geologist and a world-reputed geomorphologistJ 
2 His interest is in geomorphology. When I was finally able to 
3 locate him at home, I told him generally the facts of this 
4 case, and he told me: "I warned him years ago that that rail-
5 road could cause a landslide in that area. In my article. 
6 And just whereas you've told me, Mr. Young, it sounds like 
7 they certainly were a cause. I hate to tell you that without 
8 more, so would you send me the information that you have.11 
9 I, immediately, and this was around the 15th or 
10 16th or 18th of July sent him the depositions of Hiltz and 
11 Morgenstern and the written statement of Mr. Ozment. Within 
12 two days he called me back and he said: "Mr. Young, I am 
13 convinced that the railroad was in fact a cause of that 
14 slide. I would be happy to come to Utah. Would you sent me 
15 a retainer and I will make plane reservations." We even 
16 J talked about the days of the week that he could be available 
for trial. He purchased a plane ticket for, on July the 29th 
for the 15th of August, leaving on the 17th of August. And 
the Court probably doesn't remember, but our, but I think 
the 15th was like Wednesday of the trial week and the 17th, 
21
 j it was like Friday evening. I immediately thereafter listed 
22
 I Dr. Shroder as an expert witness for the plaintiff. Within 
23
 I the ten days in the defendant's proposed pre-trial order and 
my proposed pre-trial order. The defendant, I guess, knowing 
that their whole defense was going to be framed around geo-
24 
25 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 technical engineers versus geologists and geomorphologists, 
2 immediately objected saying "it's too late, you can't list 
3 him now, we don't have an opportunity to discover." 
4 We came here, they made a motion in limine, we had 
5 argument. I tendered Dr. Shroder for deposition, I told him 
6 I would make him available to them for a deposition. There 
7 were others involved in that motion, your Honor, a Dr. Hinsie 
8 and also a name of Archuletta. By way of commentary, the 
9 defendants did in the interim take Archulettafs deposition, 
10 did take Dr. Hinsie's deposition. 
11 Throughout the trial it began to ring in my ears, 
12 in cross examination and particularly in closing arguments 
13 that went on for about an hour, that: "What geomorphological 
14 experience do you have, Dr. Olsen? What geological experience 
15 do you have, Mr. Leonard?" It went on and on and on, in 
16 cross examination and in closing argument. The attack was on 
17 the credibility of my witnesses, not having experiences in 
18 geomorphology and geology. 
19 I was kept from bringing a world-renowned geomorph-
20 ologist to rebut or in my case in chief to present evidence 
21 of his opinion from a background of geomorphology and geology 
22 with regard to the cause of that Thistle slide. 
23 Your Honor, with all due respect, I believe that I 
24 lost this trial because the jurors believed that geomorph-
25 I oloeists and eeoloeists and their credentials more than my 
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MLED IN 
4T« DISTRICT COURT 
^
 rW 
to 16 1Z 13 P» '89 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY ^ 
E. Scott Savage 
Michael F. Richman 
Eric C. Olson 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Attorneys for Defendant The Denver and 
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT BERRETT, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 




Civil No. CV86-616 
Judge Cullen Y. Christensen 
On August 3, 1989, appeared before this Court Allen K. 
Young, counsel for plaintiffs, and Michael F. Richman and Eric 
C. Olson, counsel for defendant, on the plaintiffs1 Motion to 
Compel and the defendant's Motion to Strike Proposed Witnesses 
and Deposition Testimony and the Court having reviewed the file 
herein, having heard the argument of counsel and being 
otherwise sufficiently advised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. The parties may not call at trial any witness not 
listed in the drafts of the proposed pretrial order,-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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eye 
ixt4xexw4&e—4i-s-€-l^ sed to- the -opposing—coun&e-l, on or before July 
7, 1989. Specifically, the plaintiffs may not call J. F. 
Shroder or Fred Vincent as witnesses at trial. The plaintiffs 
may call Amos Archuleta and Mark Archuleta as witnesses at 
trial. 
2. No later than August 9, 1989, the plaintiffs' 
counsel shall deliver to the defendant's counsel a list 
identifying by page and line those portions of each Utah 
Railway deposition that the plaintiffs propose to read to the 
jury at trial. 
3. The defendant's counsel shall supply to the 
plaintiffs' counsel the input/output data from Dr. Larry 
Hansen's computer limit equilibrium analysis of the Thistle 
slide within forty-eight hours of the time at which (a) the 
plaintiffs' counsel advises the defendant's counsel that Dr. 
Joseph Olsen will not perform a limit equilibrium analysis of 
the Thistle slide or (b) the plaintiffs' counsel provides the 
defendant's counsel with the input/output data from the limit 
equilibrium analysis or analyses of the Thistle slide performed 
by Dr. Joseph Olsen. 
4. The plaintiffs' request to require James Ozment 
to bring all of his photographs of the Thistle slide to trial, 
which request was resisted by the defendant, is withdrawn. 
-2-
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5. The plaintiffs1 request to compel the appearance 
of David Hilts at a deposition on August 7, 1989 is denied upon 
the representation of the defendant's counsel that Mr. Hilts 
will not be an expert witness at the trial but only a fact 
witness. 
6. The parties shall file all remaining pretrial 
motions no later than August 4, 1989. Any opposing memoranda 
shall be filed no later than August 10, 1989. 
DATED this f£* day of August, 1989. 
CULLEN Y<^CHRISTENSEN, Judge 
Fourth Judicial District 
76700 
-3-
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1991 REVISED EDITION 
FEDERAL 
CIVIL JUDICIAL 
PROCEDURE and RULES 
as amended to July 1, 1991 
l e 16 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES 
ibdivision (f); Sanctions. Original Rule 16 did not 
tion the sanctions that might be imposed for failing to 
ply with the rule. However, courts have not hesitat-
o enforce it by appropriate measures. See, e.g., Link 
Vabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 628 (1962) (district court's 
lissal under Rule 41(b) after plaintiffs attorney failed 
ippear at a pretrial conference upheld); Admiral 
atre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre, 585 F.2d 877 (8th 
1978) (district court has discretion to exclude exhibits 
efuse to permit the testimony of a witness not listed 
r to trial in contravention of its pretrial order), 
o reflect that existing practice, and to obviate depend-
3 upon Rule 41(b) or the court's inherent power to 
alate litigation, cf. Societe Internationale Pour Par-
s is true under Rule 37(b)(2), the imposition of sanc-
ts may be sought by either the court or a party. In 
ition, the court has discretion to impose whichever 
ction it feels is appropriate under the circumstances, 
action is reviewable under the abuse-of-discretion 
ndard. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan 
zkey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976). 
ticipations Industrielles et Commercials, S.A. v. Rog-
ers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958), Rule 16(f) expressly provides for 
imposing sanctions on disobedient or recalcitrant parties, 
their attorneys, or both in four types of situations. 
Rodes, Ripple & Mooney, Sanctions Imposablefor Viola-
tions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 65-67, 
80-84, Federal Judicial Center (1981). Furthermore, ex-
plicit reference to sanctions reenforces the rule's inten-
tion to encourage forceful judicial management. 
Rule 16(f) incorporates portions of Rule 37(b)(2), which 
prescribes sanctions for failing to make discovery. This 
should facilitate application of Rule 16(f), since courts and 
lawyers already are familiar with the Rule 37 standards. 
Among the sanctions authorized by the new subdivision 
are: preclusion order, striking a pleading, staying the 
proceeding, default judgment, contempt, and charging a 
party, his attorney, or both with the expenses, including 
attorney's fees, caused by noncompliance. The contempt 
sanction, however, is only available for a violation of a 
court order. The references in Rule 16(f) are not exhaus-
tive. 
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